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BEING THE GOVERNMENT MEANS (ALMOST) NEVER
HAVING TO SAY YOU’RE SORRY: THE SAM SHEPPARD
CASE AND THE MEANING OF WRONGFUL
IMPRISONMENT
Jack P. DeSario and William D. Mason. Dr. Sam Sheppard on Trial: The Prosecutors
and the Marilyn Sheppard Murder. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2003. xii +
388 pages.

Jonathan L. Entin*
Sam Sheppard was at the center of the highest profile crime in Ohio
history.
It contained “[m]urder and mystery, society, sex and
suspense.”1 In the early morning hours of July 4, 1954, Marilyn
Sheppard, four months pregnant with her second child, was beaten to
death in her bed in the Cleveland suburb of Bay Village. The authorities
quickly focused their suspicion on her husband, Sam, a prominent
osteopathic physician, and charged him with first-degree murder. He
was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to life
imprisonment. The state courts affirmed, and the Supreme Court denied
direct review.2 Then in 1966, on habeas corpus, the Supreme Court set
aside the conviction in a landmark ruling that held that the original trial
had been tainted by prejudicial publicity.3 Sheppard was acquitted later
that year at what has been called “The Retrial of the Century”4 and died
in 1970. A quarter-century after his death, representatives of Sam
Sheppard’s estate filed suit for a declaration of innocence that would
serve as a predicate for seeking compensation for his wrongful
* Professor of Law and Political Science, Case Western Reserve University. The author thanks
William Carter, Jessie Hill, Robert Lawry, and Michael Solimine for helpful comments and Andrew
Dorchak, Robert Myers, and Lisa Peters of the Case law library and David Haberman of the
University of North Dakota law library for help in locating obscure sources.
1. State v. Sheppard, 135 N.E.2d 340, 342 (Ohio 1956).
2. State v. Sheppard, 128 N.E.2d 471 (Ohio Ct. App. 1955), aff’d, 135 N.E.2d 340 (Ohio),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 910 (1956).
3. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
4. JAMES NEFF, THE WRONG MAN: THE FINAL VERDICT ON THE DR. SAM SHEPPARD
MURDER CASE 246 (2001). This work is one of many books spawned by the Sheppard case. See
infra note 7 and accompanying text.
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imprisonment. The moving force behind this lawsuit was Sam Reese
Sheppard, who as a seven-year-old boy slept soundly through the night
in the bedroom adjacent to the one where his mother was murdered. The
Ohio Supreme Court allowed this civil case to go to trial.5 In April
2000, a jury ruled against the estate, and the state courts once more
affirmed.6
This much is uncontroverted. Almost everything else about the
Sheppard case has been a matter of intense debate. Skeptics have
consistently argued that the crime scene was not properly secured, the
authorities failed to test blood found in the bedroom and elsewhere in the
house and did not properly examine other physical evidence, alternative
suspects were ignored or superficially investigated, and the prosecutor
succumbed to extraordinary media pressure to charge an innocent man
with killing his wife. More than a dozen books and many documentaries
and movies have focused at least in part on the case.7 The latest entry is
a new volume that gives the government’s side of the story. This work,
by lawyer-political scientist Jack DeSario, and William Mason, the
prosecutor who successfully fended off the civil suit, serves as a useful
primary source but will not end the debate. It is an advocacy document
that presents the case against Sam Sheppard in very strong terms.
Precisely because it is an advocacy document, however, this book
probably will not persuade many who continue to harbor doubts.
At the same time, the appearance of this book might stimulate
larger questions. Part I of this essay assesses the book. Some of the
larger questions are considered next. Part II addresses the absence of a
system of interlocutory appeal in Ohio civil cases, which unfortunately
prevented pretrial resolution of the controlling legal questions in the
third Sheppard case: whether the statute of limitations had run on the
innocence action and whether the claim had died with Sam Sheppard.
Part III uses this case to ponder further questions about the meaning of
innocence and the government’s responsibilities to persons who are

5. State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster, 701 N.E.2d 1002 (Ohio 1998).
6. See Murray v. State, No. 78374, 2002 WL 337732 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2002), appeal
not allowed, 772 N.E.2d 1202 (Ohio 2002).
7. For a detailed listing, see Patricia J. Falk, Introduction to Symposium, Toward More
Reliable Jury Verdicts?: Law, Technology, and Media Developments Since the Trials of Dr. Sam
Sheppard, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 385, 385-86 n.3 (2001). It is also widely, though perhaps
mistakenly, believed that the Sheppard case was the basis for “The Fugitive,” a popular ABC
television series that ran from 1963 to 1967 and a successful 1993 Warner Brothers movie starring
Harrison Ford and Tommy Lee Jones. The original script was a Western; the creator updated it to
focus on a falsely accused contemporary physician when the first version languished for several
years. See NEFF, supra note 4, at 234-35.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol38/iss1/5

2

Entin: The Sam Sheppard Case
ENTIN.DOC

12/17/2004 12:12 PM

2005]

THE SAM SHEPPARD CASE

141

wrongfully imprisoned.
I. THE PROSECUTOR’S PERSPECTIVE IN PERSPECTIVE
As befits a book that focuses on the government’s approach to the
civil case, this volume begins with William Mason’s ascension to the
office of Cuyahoga County Prosecutor in January 1999.8 Many readers
will hope for a more complete explanation of the circumstances of
Mason’s selection by the county Democratic party rather than by the
voters. The authors do not explain that his predecessor, Stephanie Tubbs
Jones, resigned after her election to Congress in November 19989 or that
Ohio law authorized the county Democratic party to name an interim
prosecutor to serve until the next general election.10
Starting with Mason’s rise to office also puts the focus on him
rather than on the case or on Marilyn Sheppard, “the true victim.”11
Readers learn about Marilyn Sheppard’s murder and Sam Sheppard’s
criminal trials from the prosecutor’s perspective. Mason initially “had
no opinion about Dr. Sheppard’s guilt or innocence”12 and “set out to
learn everything about the case”13 in preparation for the civil trial.
Although the new prosecutor might have approached the matter with an
open mind, he apparently did not consult with Carmen Marino, the first
assistant prosecutor under Tubbs Jones who had developed some doubts
about Sam Sheppard’s guilt after reviewing the file but refused to settle
the civil case.14 Before long, Mason concluded that Sheppard was
almost certainly the real killer and litigated accordingly.15
8. JACK P. DESARIO & WILLIAM D. MASON, DR. SAM SHEPPARD ON TRIAL: THE
PROSECUTORS AND THE MARILYN SHEPPARD MURDER 1 (2003).
9. NEFF, supra note 4, at 339.
10. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 305.02 (West 1994). Mason was unopposed in the 2000
general election. See Rich Exner, Democrats Still Rule in Cuyahoga Offices, PLAIN DEALER, Nov.
8, 2000, at 5B.
11. DESARIO & MASON, supra note 8, at 90. See also id. at 324 (“But primarily,
fundamentally, Mason was consumed by a vision of Marilyn Sheppard,” who was “the real
victim”); id. at 326 (Marilyn Sheppard’s stepmother describing her as “the real victim”).
12. Id. at 4.
13. Id. at 5.
14. See NEFF, supra note 4, at 339; see also id. at 321-22, 331-32. One might infer from
Neff’s account that Mason ignored Marino because he had unsuccessfully sought the top job that
Mason ultimately won. See id. at 339. In fact, Mason tapped another of his early rivals, Steven
Dever, as co-counsel at the civil trial. See DESARIO & MASON, supra note 8, at 57.
15. See DESARIO & MASON, supra note 8, at 53. Because he was “convinced of Dr. Sam
Sheppard’s guilt,” Mason refused to consider a settlement. Id. at 140. The possibility of a mid-trial
settlement became a source of public contention, but the case proceeded to final judgment after the
judge considered imposing sanctions against the prosecutor for disclosing the terms of the Sheppard
estate’s settlement proposal. See id. at 138-41, 373-76.
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The prosecutor’s theory of the case was straightforward: Sam
Sheppard, a serial philanderer whose wife was frustrated by his
infidelity, argued with Marilyn in their bedroom, beat her to death
(probably with a bedroom lamp), and invented a tale of a bushy-haired
intruder who slugged him unconscious when he responded to Marilyn’s
calls for help, then knocked him out again when he struggled with him
on the Lake Erie beach behind the family home. After killing his wife,
Sam called his brother Steve to help him fix up the murder scene, which
apparently was wiped clean of fingerprints,16 and pulled out some
drawers and tipped over his medical bag on the first floor of the house in
a clumsy effort to simulate a burglary. Then Steve took charge of Sam’s
treatment at Bay View, the nearby osteopathic hospital that was founded
by their father and where all three Sheppard brothers were on staff.
Steve restricted the authorities’ access to Sam and substituted an x-ray of
another person in an attempt to show that Sam had suffered a broken
neck while fending off the murderer.17
Much of the prosecution’s theory in the civil case rested on the
testimony of three witnesses. One was Sheppard himself, who testified
at the first criminal trial in 1954 but not at the retrial in 1966.18 The
second was Gregg McCrary, a former FBI agent with wide experience
investigating sex crimes.19 The third was Robert White, a prominent
neurosurgeon and professor at Case Western Reserve University’s

16. The police actually found many unidentifiable fingerprints in the house, and some
surfaces that appeared to have been wiped had been cleaned to remove soot and smoke after a 1953
fire in the house. See NEFF, supra note 4, at 73.
17. Neighbors reported that Steve Sheppard’s car sped away from his home at 4:30 a.m. the
day of the murder; others told of a car running stop signs in town around that time. See DESARIO &
MASON, supra note 8, at 47-48. The prosecutor’s office noted that Steve arrived at Sam and
Marilyn’s home neat and clean only twelve minutes after saying that he was awakened by a
telephone call from his sister-in-law informing him of the murder. Id. at 22, 48, 94. This seemed
suspicious because Mason and the retired Bay Village police chief, who was the first law
enforcement officer to arrive at the scene, found that it took twelve minutes just to drive from
Steve’s house to the murder scene when they reenacted the trip very early on a Sunday morning in
1999. See id. at 48. No testimony about the reenactment was presented at the civil trial, perhaps
because the driving conditions in Bay Village had changed in the more than four decades since the
crime occurred.
Moreover, although Mason’s team questioned why Steve Sheppard did not testify at the
civil trial despite his central role in the events following the murder, see id. at 316-17, the
prosecutor seems not to have tried very hard to obtain his version of the story. The authors note that
Mason’s office conducted a telephone interview with him. Id. at 73. They do not point out, nor did
the jury learn, that the prosecutor’s office cancelled two scheduled deposition appointments with
him. See NEFF, supra note 4, at 377.
18. See DESARIO & MASON, supra note 8, at 63.
19. See id. at 65-66.
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medical school.20
Using Sheppard’s prior testimony posed no Fifth Amendment
problem at the civil trial, although the authors do not fully explain why
this was so. They misleadingly say that the privilege against selfincrimination “does not extend to civil trials.”21 In fact, the privilege can
apply in civil proceedings, but only when criminal liability might
ensue.22 Because Sheppard had long since died, there was no possibility
that his 1954 testimony, which was completely voluntary, could lead to
criminal punishment after the 2000 civil trial.
Mason wanted to use that testimony because he was convinced that
Sheppard came across as “evasive, sarcastic, and arrogant.”23 His
comments about his wife’s menstrual problems and other health matters
seemed “distasteful, even boorish.”24 Sheppard gave authorities a series
of statements that “he had subtly tried to change as new evidence was
uncovered;” eventually, the prosecutor argued, “some of the
embellishments would become inconsistent, the details of the stories
confused.”25 Moreover, Sheppard had lied at a public inquest about his
relationship with Susan Hayes, a medical technician at Bay View
Hospital with whom he carried on a notorious three-year affair ending in
the spring of 1954, behavior that prompted Marilyn Sheppard to
contemplate a divorce.26 Indeed, so central is this testimony that the
authors devote approximately thirty-five pages to direct quotations from
the trial transcript.27
The two main live witnesses also played a key role in Mason’s
case. McCrary, the former FBI agent, quickly concluded that Marilyn
Sheppard’s death was “your garden-variety domestic violence
homicide,”28 not a sexually motivated crime as the estate maintained,
and offered a detailed explanation for this conclusion at trial.29 Dr.
20. See id. at 297.
21. Id. at 60.
22. See 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2254, at 331
(John T. McNaughton rev. 1961); 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1280, at 512-14 (2d ed. 1990).
23. DESARIO & MASON, supra note 8, at 273.
24. Id. at 253.
25. Id. at 202. The prosecutor also noted a change in the Sheppard team’s treatment of blood
spots elsewhere in the house. During the 1954 trial, the defense treated them as irrelevant to the
murder by suggesting that family members and the dog might have bled there. At the civil trial, the
estate argued that those spots might have come from the real killer. See id. at 253.
26. Id. at 16-19, 277. For additional details, see NEFF, supra note 4, at 61-66.
27. See DESARIO & MASON, supra note 8, 239-73.
28. Id. at 66.
29. See id. at 293-94.
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White, the neurosurgeon, testified that Sam Sheppard’s injuries were not
nearly as serious as had been claimed. He particularly emphasized that
the chip fracture of Sheppard’s C-2 vertebra that had been observed in
an x-ray taken on July 4, the day of the murder, did not appear on x-rays
taken on July 7.30 On redirect examination, he explained the discrepancy
as follows: “It was a simple fact that the films were substituted. It was
perfectly obvious.”31 In other words, the prosecutor suggests, Sam
Sheppard had never suffered a fractured vertebra; someone (presumably
his brother Steve, his attending physician, or someone acting at his
behest) had produced an x-ray of another patient on July 4 to support
Sam Sheppard’s concocted story about the bushy-haired intruder.32
Despite the importance of this testimony, it contained potentially
significant gaps and rested on controversial assumptions. For example,
Sam Sheppard’s unattractive personality on the witness stand and
cavalier disregard of his marriage vows did not necessarily make him a
murderer.33 He had affairs not only with Susan Hayes but also with one
of his patients and, during his medical residency in California, with
several other women.34 Promiscuity, or at least infidelity, was common
among surgeons at that time, particularly among the established men
who served as teachers and role models for new doctors such as
Sheppard and his peers.35 Accordingly, Mason explored the possibility
that Sam Sheppard was not the father of Marilyn’s unborn child. If this
were true, then perhaps he exploded in a murderous rage when she told
him so. Such a scenario would provide a motive for the killing.36 The
authorities in 1954 had looked into the possibility that someone else had

30. Id. at 297, 299. Dr. White also could find no basis for Sheppard’s other allegedly serious
injuries. See id. at 299-300.
31. Id. at 303. Mason’s co-counsel, Steven Dever, emphasized this point during closing
arguments. See id. at 317.
32. To be sure, Mason believes that Sam Sheppard suffered genuine injuries but that they
were much less serious than he claimed and were inflicted by Marilyn while resisting his attack on
her. Id. at 124-25.
33. As Justice Frankfurter observed in a different context, “the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people.” United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
34. See DESARIO & MASON, supra note 8, at 19, 77-78; NEFF, supra note 4, at 48-49, 52, 94.
35. See NEFF, supra note 4, at 4, 48.
36. Rumors of Sam Sheppard’s sterility persist to the present. A taxi driver offered this
explanation of the murder to a participant in a recent symposium on the Sheppard case. In fact,
Sheppard impregnated his second wife after his release from prison; that pregnancy ended in a
miscarriage. See Lawrence M. Solan, Convicting the Innocent Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: Some
Lessons About Jury Instructions from the Sheppard Case, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 465, 467 n.10
(2001). For further details about the pregnancy and miscarriage, see NEFF, supra note 4, at 237-38.
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impregnated Mrs. Sheppard but could not confirm it.37 Scientific
advances in the intervening years held out the prospect of resolving the
issue, so the prosecutor had both Marilyn Sheppard and her fetus
exhumed in late 1999.38 In the end, though, the coroner had to concede
that Sam Sheppard was probably the father.39
There were analogous pitfalls with the two key live witnesses. For
instance, McCrary’s conclusion that Marilyn Sheppard was the victim of
a domestic homicide rested on his experience applying the FBI’s crime
classification manual hundreds of times; he claimed never to have gone
wrong in using the manual’s criteria.40 But McCrary’s former FBI
supervisor, manual co-author John Douglas, rejected McCrary’s
assessment. Douglas, who did not testify, reportedly saw no evidence of
escalating rage culminating in explosive violence that is typical of
domestic homicides.41 Moreover, McCrary apparently assumed that
Marilyn Sheppard’s body had been repositioned on the bed to suggest
that she had been sexually assaulted.42 That assumption is inconsistent
with the view of the prosecutor’s blood-spatter expert, who testified that
she was beaten exactly where her body was found.43
Similarly, Dr. White’s suggestion that the first x-ray had been
switched overlooked testimony at the 1954 trial about the circumstances
under which Sheppard’s x-rays had been taken. The July 4 x-ray was
taken under different conditions and using different techniques than
37. See NEFF, supra note 4, at 26-27. Ironically, Sheppard’s defense lawyer at the first trial
introduced the sterility question in what in retrospect appears to have been a strategic blunder. See
id. at 137-38.
38. See DESARIO & MASON, supra note 8, at 50. Although the prosecutor’s public statement
announcing the exhumation was silent on the point, one of the questions to be investigated was
paternity. See id. at 45-46, 49; NEFF, supra note 4, at 341 (characterizing the fetus as “the true
prize”).
39. See DESARIO & MASON, supra note 8, at 215. On direct examination at the civil trial, the
coroner characterized the DNA tests on the paternity of the fetus as “inconclusive.” Id. at 213. This
was technically accurate, because the test could not be run a second time due to the lack of
sufficient genetic material for a confirming retest. The initial test suggested a 99.99 percent
likelihood that Sam Sheppard was the father. See NEFF, supra note 4, at 345.
40. See DESARIO & MASON, supra note 8, at 290, 296.
41. See NEFF, supra note 4, at 332-33, 370-71. The estate did present expert testimony from
Dr. Emanuel Tanay, a well-known professor of psychiatry at Wayne State University. Dr. Tanay
contended that Marilyn Sheppard had died in a sexually motivated homicide perpetrated by a
sadistic third party, not in a domestic homicide committed by her spouse. See DESARIO & MASON,
supra note 8, at 149-53; NEFF, supra note 4, at 357-61.
42. See DESARIO & MASON, supra note 8, at 294; NEFF, supra note 4, at 370, 382.
43. See DESARIO & MASON, supra note 8, at 219; NEFF, supra note 4, at 368, 381-82. One of
the estate’s experts also testified that the body had not been moved. See DESARIO & MASON, supra
note 8, at 166. Although he was vigorously cross-examined on other aspects of his testimony, the
authors do not report that he was questioned about this conclusion. See id. at 171-75.
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were the July 7 x-rays. The methodological change on July 7 was a
mistake, according to the radiologist who had ordered the x-rays on both
days, but he didn’t learn of the error until later.44 This does not
necessarily resolve the x-ray discrepancy, but it might explain why the
later images failed to show the chip fracture that was seen on the earlier
one.
Of course, the invalidity of the other-man-as-father-of-the-fetus
theory does not necessarily exonerate Sam Sheppard. Perhaps he and his
wife argued about something else before he killed her. That is
speculation, however, because the authorities have no direct evidence on
this subject. Moreover, even if Terry Gilbert, the lawyer representing the
estate, had more effectively cross-examined or otherwise rebutted the
two key witnesses than he apparently did, the result of the trial might
still have been the same. There was, after all, more to the case than this.
In particular, Gilbert organized his argument around the claim that the
real killer was a man named Richard Eberling, who had been the
Sheppards’ window washer and was working in the house a couple of
days before the murder. Eberling died in prison in 1998 while serving a
life sentence for murdering an elderly widow for whom he was caring.45
Gilbert’s focus on Eberling might have rested on the assumption that “it
takes a theory to beat a theory,”46 but it also helped to focus the
44. See NEFF, supra note 4, at 353-54.
45. See id. at 293-94, 304-06, 338.
46. Whether this notion applies to trial advocacy, see infra note 182 and accompanying text
(discussing the relevance of identifying the real perpetrator to the success of wrongfulimprisonment claims), it has attracted support from some prominent legal scholars. Perhaps its
most prominent academic proponent is Richard Epstein. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN
GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 15 (1992); Richard A.
Epstein, Common Law, Labor Law, and Reality: A Rejoinder to Professors Getman and Kohler, 92
YALE L.J. 1435, 1435 (1983); Richard A. Epstein, A Last Word on Eminent Domain, 41 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 253, 275 (1986). Other scholars associated with law and economics and rational choice
also endorse this position. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary
Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 434 (1993); Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash, and
the Fraud on the Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 907, 915 (1989); Jonathan R. Macey, Public
Choice and the Legal Academy, 86 GEO. L.J. 1075, 1076 (1998). The argument is controversial,
however. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation:
Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 913 n.214 (1992) (describing “it takes a theory
to beat a theory” as “an intellectual version of the child’s game ‘king of the hill’” and noting that
“[t]he idea that law must be based on the best-tested social scientific theory, no matter what the
level of doubt accompanying it (or that no form of regulation should exist unless based on a
scientifically validated theory), employs a method of legal reasoning that is hardly mainstream and
is exceedingly political”); Theodore J. St. Antoine, How the Wagner Act Came to Be: A Prospectus,
96 MICH. L. REV. 2201, 2208 (1998) (“I have always thought that facts trump theories.”); Thomas
S. Ulen, A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical Work, and the Scientific Method in the
Study of Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 875, 887 n.47 (rejecting “it takes a theory to beat a theory” as
inaccurate and noting that intellectual advances typically occur when “anomalies arise and are either
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government’s trial preparation.47 Much of Gilbert’s case rested on
scientific evidence placing Eberling at the murder scene, which in turn
presumed that Marilyn Sheppard had drawn blood from her assailant
either by biting or scratching him. The prosecutors caught the estate’s
experts unawares by pointing out that only Type O blood, which was
Marilyn Sheppard’s blood type, was found in the bedroom and that
Eberling had Type A blood.48 Mason’s team also raised questions about
the validity of the estate’s DNA analysis of the blood at the scene,49
which was particularly ironic because the estate’s main DNA expert had
been asked to train the Cuyahoga County coroner’s staff to do such
testing.50 Dental experts for both sides testified that tooth fragments
found near Marilyn Sheppard’s body had to have been knocked out by a

explained within an amended paradigm or serve as observations that make a case for another
paradigm (as yet undefined)”); see also Jeanne L. Schroeder, Chix Nix Bundle-O-Stix: A Feminist
Critique of the Disaggregation of Property, 93 MICH. L. REV. 239, 277 n.92 (1994) (criticizing “the
old saw of legal scholarship that ‘it takes a theory to beat a theory’” for “view[ing] scholarship as
litigation with burdens of proof”); Mark Tushnet, The Degradation of Constitutional Discourse, 81
GEO. L.J. 251, 254 & n.11 (1992) (noting that “it takes a theory to beat a theory” reflects a tendency
to “discuss[] law as if it were a scientific enterprise”).
47. See DESARIO & MASON, supra note 8, at 42, 61.
48. See id. at 173, 179. A rebuttal witness for the estate explained that blood tests sometimes
falsely produce Type O results for Type A blood, but by then the damage to the estate’s case was
probably irreparable. See id. at 305.
Nor was this the only potential problem with the Eberling theory. Although Eberling was
said to have admitted to killing Marilyn Sheppard, Mason’s team raised questions about the
credibility of certain aspects of the testimony of the one witness who appeared at trial. See id. at
143, 317. The prosecutor’s office was also prepared to raise serious questions about the veracity of
a confession that Eberling reportedly made to a fellow prisoner. See id. at 43.
Finally, journalist James Neff cites similarities between the killings of Marilyn Sheppard
and Ethel Durkin, for which Eberling was sentenced to life imprisonment. In addition, Durkin’s
two sisters (both of whom Eberling knew) died violently in circumstances suggesting Eberling’s
involvement. One of those deaths was more similar to Marilyn Sheppard’s than was Durkin’s. See
NEFF, supra note 4, at 294, 317. There is, however, one important difference between Marilyn
Sheppard and the other women. Durkin and her sisters were elderly and obese, see id. at 294, 318,
whereas Mrs. Sheppard was young, athletic, and attractive. See DESARIO & MASON, supra note 8,
at 13; NEFF, supra note 4, at 43. Indeed, Neff suggests that Eberling viewed Marilyn Sheppard
“both as a sex object and as the perfect mother he never had.” Id. at 384. Whatever Eberling’s
interest in Durkin and her sisters, it is extremely unlikely that he regarded any of them in sexual or
maternal terms. Indeed, Eberling and one of Durkin’s sisters strongly disliked each other. See id. at
317-18.
49. See DESARIO & MASON, supra note 8, at 178-79, 180-81. The estate’s expert added that
Eberling might have been the source of sperm found in Mrs. Sheppard’s body. Id. at 177-78. He
conceded that the sperm could have been deposited two or three days before the murder. Id. at 179.
50. See NEFF, supra note 4, at 342. In addition, the first DNA expert consulted by the
prosecutor’s office in connection with this case, a respected Defense Department scientist who
agreed to test Marilyn Sheppard’s fetus to determine whether Sam was the father, generally agreed
with the findings of the estate’s expert. See id. at 341, 368.
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blow rather than forced out by biting the killer,51 but other experts
disagreed about whether a scar on Eberling’s wrist could have come
from a scratch or gouge inflicted by Marilyn Sheppard in the course of
defending herself.52
Beyond these and other scientific disputes, the prosecutor’s office
relied on less technical and seemingly more easy-to-grasp notions. Of
particular significance was the silence of the Sheppard family dog during
the crime. Mason’s team repeatedly asked why the dog failed to bark if
an intruder committed this brutal murder.53 Less important but quite
dramatic was the last-minute production of a lamp that supposedly
matched the pattern embedded in a blood stain on Marilyn Sheppard’s
pillow to suggest that a missing bedroom lamp was the murder
weapon.54 In support of this notion, a retired handyman testified that he
had repaired a lamp for the Sheppards and returned it to their bedroom
two days before the murder.55 Fortunately for the prosecution, Gilbert
did not notice that the impression on the pillow was actually much
smaller than the harp of the lamp that the government displayed.56
51. See DESARIO & MASON, supra note 8, at 163, 216. On cross-examination, the
government’s expert conceded that she might have bitten her assailant before her teeth were
knocked out. Id. at 216-17.
52. See id. at 164, 211, 232. One difficulty with the scar theory is that police records note the
presence of the scar in Eberling’s 1959 arrest record but not in a 1956 record when he was merely a
suspect. After being arrested in 1959, Eberling confessed to stealing items from the homes of his
customers. Among the loot were two rings that had belonged to Marilyn Sheppard; he stole them in
1958 from the home of Sam’s brother Richard. See id. at 42, 148; NEFF, supra note 4, at 195. A
Bay Village police officer testified that the 1956 record might have been incomplete because
Eberling was not arrested. DESARIO & MASON, supra note 8, at 148.
53. See DESARIO & MASON, supra note 8, at 38, 75, 92, 315. This point apparently made a
deep impression on the jurors. See id. at 325. Neither the lawyers in the courtroom nor the authors
in this book allude to the famous Sherlock Holmes story about a dog that “did nothing in the nighttime.” ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 335, 347
(1930). Cf. Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 596, 602 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(citing this story and remarking on “the fact that a watchdog did not bark in the night”).
54. See DESARIO & MASON, supra note 8, at 308. An assistant prosecutor had come up with
this theory during trial preparation. See id. at 68-70.
55. See id. at 286-87. The jurors apparently did not mention the lamp to Mason during posttrial interviews, although they emphasized the testimony of McCrary and White as well as the
silence of the dog. See id. at 325; see also NEFF, supra note 4, at 382 (reporting two jurors’
skepticism about the lamp theory).
56. See NEFF, supra note 4, at 375. Nor was that all that Gilbert seems to have missed.
Evidence from 1954 suggested that there was no lamp in the guest bedroom the Sheppards were
using at the time of the murder. That room had twin beds, whereas the master bedroom that the
Sheppards had previously been using had a double bed. The authors note that this move reflected
tensions in the marriage during the spring of 1954. See DESARIO & MASON, supra note 8, at 19. A
neighbor who sometimes babysat for young Sam Reese Sheppard and stayed in that room when
Sam and Marilyn were sleeping in the master bedroom told the police that she had not seen a lamp
there. Sam Reese told the coroner that there was a small lamp in the master bedroom but none in
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In the end, the jury quickly returned a verdict in favor of the state,
thereby rejecting the claim that Sam Sheppard had been wrongfully
imprisoned.57 How could the civil jury, in less than an afternoon, reach
a conclusion that seemed diametrically opposite to that reached by the
jury at Sam Sheppard’s retrial with only a few more hours of
deliberation?58 The authors carefully explain the different burden of
proof: at the criminal trial the state had to prove Sam Sheppard guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas at the civil trial the estate had to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Sheppard was innocent.59
In other words, the jurors at the criminal retrial might have suspected
that Sheppard murdered his wife but perhaps were not sufficiently
confident that he had done so. This is a far cry from concluding that he
probably had not killed her.60
Nevertheless, the prosecutor at the civil trial was not content to
argue that the estate had not carried its burden of proof. Mason was
“sure, beyond any doubt, of Sam Sheppard’s guilt.”61 Accordingly, he
set out to prove that point. Moreover, he sought to vindicate the honor
and reputation of his office and of the other law enforcement agencies
that had handled the Sheppard case from the beginning.62 To this end,
the book contains scarcely a hint of criticism directed toward Dr. Samuel
Gerber, the coroner who conducted a rowdy and unusual public inquest
into Marilyn Sheppard’s death,63 repeatedly claimed that the time of
death was considerably earlier than the autopsy suggested,64 and insisted
the guest bedroom. The Sheppards’ cleaning woman told detectives that she did not notice anything
missing from the room where Marilyn was killed. See NEFF, supra note 4, at 370.
57. See DESARIO & MASON, supra note 8, at 323-24.
58. See NEFF, supra note 4, at 279-80 (noting that the judge at the two-week retrial charged
the jury at 10:30 a.m. and the jury returned its verdict at 10:45 p.m.), 378 (noting that the civil jury
left the courtroom at 11:15 a.m. following a nine-week trial and delivered its verdict by 4:30 p.m.).
59. See DESARIO & MASON, supra note 8, at 58-59. They also quote the judge’s statement to
the jurors at the beginning of the civil trial that they were “the first jury to ever be called upon to
answer the question whether Samuel H. Sheppard was innocent of the murder of Marilyn
Sheppard.” Id. at 84.
60. Indeed, the jury foreman at the second criminal trial said: “I had the impression he wasn’t
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” NEFF, supra note 4, at 281. Another juror explained: “I can’t
say that I know he didn’t do it.” Id. at 281.
61. DESARIO & MASON, supra note 8, at 53.
62. See id. at 200 (noting that, after the estate rested its case in the civil trial, Mason would
“[f]inally, after years, even decades, of public attacks on the integrity of the Cuyahoga County
Prosecutor’s Office” have a chance “to dispel the ugly myth that the law enforcement community
somehow had conspired to get Sam Sheppard”); id. at 304 (noting that, after the state rested its case,
“no one could validly argue that the law enforcement community had acted in an arbitrary or
unprofessional manner”).
63. See NEFF, supra note 4, at 87-91.
64. See id. at 17-18, 73, 167.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2005

11

Akron Law Review, Vol. 38 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 5
ENTIN.DOC

150

12/17/2004 12:12 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[38:139

that the murder weapon was some sort of surgical instrument,65 all of
which had the effect of implicating Sam Sheppard as the culprit.66 And
while the authors explain that the Supreme Court set aside Sheppard’s
conviction due to prejudicial publicity,67 during the civil trial Mason
elicited testimony from at least two witnesses to the effect that the 1954
trial courtroom was orderly.68
Precisely because this book presents prosecutor Mason’s
perspective, it reads like a lawyer’s brief. Like all good briefs, it is
hardly impartial. Facts and arguments are presented in a way that
supports the government’s position. For example, the Supreme Court
decision setting aside the conviction is described as “not suggesting that
Sheppard was innocent, only that the procedure used to convict him was
improper.”69 This statement is technically accurate, but it glosses over
the difficulties posed by the original trial. The book does not mention
that, on direct appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court described the trial as
having been conducted in an “atmosphere of a ‘Roman holiday’ for the
news media,”70 or that two justices dissented from the affirmance of
Sheppard’s conviction in part because they found at least reasonable
doubt as to his guilt.71 Nor do the authors refer to Justice Frankfurter’s
pointed statement that the U.S. Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in
the original case “in no wise implies that this Court approves the
decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio.”72
65. See id. at 142. On cross-examination at Sheppard’s second trial, Dr. Gerber was forced to
concede that he could not produce any surgical instrument that matched the blood stain pattern on
Marilyn Sheppard’s pillow and might have been used against her despite his having searched all
over the country before the first trial to locate the type of instrument he had in mind. See id. at 261.
DeSario and Mason reproduce portions of this cross-examination, see DESARIO & MASON, supra
note 8, at 197-98, but suggest that it had less impact than did most contemporary observers. See id.
at 198; NEFF, supra note 4, at 262. The prosecutor’s office conceded during final argument at the
civil trial that Dr. Gerber had been wrong about the murder weapon. See DESARIO & MASON,
supra note 8, at 317.
66. The notion that Gerber focused on Sam Sheppard as the culprit in a “rush to judgment”
was a key element of his defense from the very beginning. See NEFF, supra note 4, at 162. Gerber
allegedly disliked the Sheppards at least in part because they were osteopaths rather than M.D.s.
See DESARIO & MASON, supra note 8, at 311; NEFF, supra note 4, at 15; see also infra notes 75-76
and accompanying text. Gerber further suspected, correctly as it turned out, that the Sheppards had
been performing abortions for many years at a time when abortion was prohibited. Although
Gerber strongly objected to this practice, many Cleveland area physicians routinely referred patients
who wanted abortions to the Sheppards. See NEFF, supra note 4, at 37.
67. See DESARIO & MASON, supra note 8, at 6.
68. See id. at 285, 288.
69. Id. at 7.
70. State v. Sheppard, 135 N.E.2d 340, 342 (Ohio 1956).
71. See id. at 348 (Taft, J., joined by Hart, J., dissenting).
72. Sheppard v. Ohio, 352 U.S. 910, 911 (1956) (memorandum of Frankfurter, J.).
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Similarly, Dr. Charles Elkins, one of the physicians who examined
Sam Sheppard and documented his injuries on the day of the murder, is
referred to as a “Bay View doctor.”73 In fact, Elkins was an M.D., not
an osteopath, and had no connection with Bay View Hospital. Both of
these facts help explain why the Sheppards asked him to examine Sam.74
The medical establishment, made up of M.D.s, looked down on
osteopaths as inferior physicians if not quacks.75 These attitudes were
shared by many Cleveland M.D.s.76 Bringing in Dr. Elkins meant that
not all the examining physicians were osteopaths. Moreover, his
independence from Bay View might have been intended to blunt claims
that the Sheppard family was simply protecting one of its own.77
The book also contains some gratuitous characterizations of
Sheppard and members of his family. Perhaps the only person who
receives praise is Jane Reese, Marilyn Sheppard’s stepmother, who
always believed that Sam committed the crime and who testified for the
state at the civil trial.78 As for everyone else, Mason found it “bizarre”
that Sam Sheppard got involved in organized wrestling while in prison,79
a curious criticism from someone who had wrestled competitively in
Frankfurter’s separate statement addressed only the question of prejudicial publicity that allegedly
deprived Sheppard his right to a fair trial. It did not consider any issue relating to guilt. Id.
73. DESARIO & MASON, supra note 8, at 96. Nor do they report that Dr. Elkins, a
neurosurgeon on the medical faculty at Case Western Reserve University, met with Dr. Gerber after
examining Sheppard or that the coroner delayed Sam’s interrogation for two days as a result of their
conversation. See NEFF, supra note 4, at 28-29.
74. See NEFF, supra note 4, at 28-29. Although Dr. Elkins did not document the existence of
a chip fracture of the C-2 vertebra, see DESARIO & MASON, supra note 8, at 127, he did report that
Sheppard’s neck muscles went into spasms when his neck was pressed at that vertebra. See NEFF,
supra note 4, at 29.
75. The American Medical Association regarded osteopaths as “cultists” rather than
physicians for many years. See NORMAN GEVITZ, THE D.O.S: OSTEOPATHIC MEDICINE IN
AMERICA 101-02, 104, 106, 108, 110-11, 114 (1982). The AMA backed off slightly from its hardline position when it acquiesced in the 1962 merger of the California Medical Association with the
California Osteopathic Association, although tensions between M.D.s and osteopaths continued.
See id. at 117, 123-29. On other tensions between M.D.s and osteopaths, see id. at 26-28, 39-42, 82,
95.
76. See NEFF, supra note 4, at 35-37. Indeed, the first osteopathic medical school in Ohio
was not established until 1977. See GEVITZ, supra note 75, at 135.
77. Elkins’ examination did not in fact prevent criticism to this effect. During his opening
statement at the civil trial, Mason emphasized that Steve Sheppard “whisked Sam from the murder
scene, taking him to the family hospital.” DESARIO & MASON, supra note 8, at 94. One of his
expert witnesses, Dr. Robert White, testified: “I have never seen a case like this where an individual
is taken off to a hospital that is owned by a family and is literally treated, examined, and buttressed
by the family.” Id. at 301. Similar sentiments were widespread in 1954. See NEFF, supra note 4, at
55, 84-85.
78. See DESARIO & MASON, supra note 8, at 47, 285, 326.
79. Id. at 78.
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both high school and college.80 The authors add that neither Steve, the
brother whom the authorities suspect of orchestrating the family coverup, nor Sam Reese, the surviving son, attended Sam Sheppard’s funeral
in 1970.81 Perhaps this was intended to suggest that Sheppard had
alienated his close relatives. In fact, both of them were in Europe when
he died.82 Mason also regarded as “macabre” Sam Reese’s desire to
reunite the remains of his parents and his unborn brother after the final
exhumation.83 The prosecutor apparently has little sympathy for
someone involved with a religion he regards as exotic84 and cannot
comprehend why the younger Sheppard might have wanted to make
some gesture reinforcing the familial bonds that were shattered when he
was seven years old. Perhaps this is an understandable reaction to Sam
Reese’s harsh criticism of law enforcement agencies, including the
prosecutor’s office, but in light of the outcome of the trial Mason might
have foregone the opportunity to score this particular rhetorical point.85
II. WHY THE CIVIL CASE WENT TO TRIAL: SOME QUIRKS OF OHIO
PROCEDURE
The book ends with the jury verdict, but the case did not. The
Sheppard estate appealed unsuccessfully. Without addressing the merits,
the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Eighth District held that the claim was
barred because the statute of limitations had run and the wrongful-

80. See id. at 2.
81. See id. at 79.
82. See NEFF, supra note 4, at 289.
83. DESARIO & MASON, supra note 8, at 49.
84. See id. at 49-50 (emphasizing Sam Reese’s desire to invite his Zen master and other
Buddhist friends to solemnize Marilyn Sheppard’s exhumation and noting his attire on the day of
the exhumation).
85. There are also a few editorial lapses. The word “waver” is consistently misspelled as
“waiver.” Id. at 83, 93, 166, 224, 311. The court that granted Sam Sheppard’s habeas corpus
petition is described as “the U.S. District Court of Ohio.” Id. at 6. It was actually the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 231 F. Supp. 37 (S.D. Ohio
1964), rev’d, 346 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1965), rev’d, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). Marilyn Sheppard is said to
have attended Skidmore College “in Pennsylvania.” DESARIO & MASON, supra note 8, at 14.
Skidmore is actually located in Saratoga Springs, New York. A sentence announcing the date on
which trial testimony began introduces a discussion of the second day of testimony. See id. at 107;
see also id. at 101-06 (summarizing the first day of testimony). Finally, some of the writing is
inelegant. A particularly awkward sentence relates to the arrest of Richard Eberling for theft in
1959: “Indeed, a search of his home revealed hundreds of stolen items, including Marilyn
Sheppard’s ring, which in 1958 was reported stolen from jewelry boxes stored at Richard
Sheppard’s house (another of Eberling’s clients).” Id. at 42. Presumably Eberling was hired by
Richard Sheppard rather than by Sheppard’s house. These are small problems, but their cumulative
effect is distressing.
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imprisonment claim did not survive Sam Sheppard’s death in 1970.86
Under Ohio law, a claim based on a statute must be brought within six
years.87 A claim for wrongful imprisonment could not have been
brought at common law, so this claim was based on a statute and was
governed by the six-year limit. The case was filed about thirty years
after Sheppard’s acquittal and hence was untimely.88 Moreover, the
wrongful-imprisonment claim had abated with Sheppard’s demise for
two reasons. First, such claims were not encompassed by the Ohio
survival law, which covers “injuries to the person”;89 that term includes
only physical injuries, not the deprivation of individual rights at issue in
this case.90 Second, the statutory language refers only to “the individual
who was actually imprisoned,” which prevented the administrator of
Sheppard’s estate from maintaining the action.91 In short, the case never
should have gone to trial.
This is an unsatisfactory resolution. For one thing, the grounds
relied on by the court of appeals were precisely those that former
prosecutor Stephanie Tubbs Jones advanced in her unsuccessful effort to
get the complaint dismissed before she left office.92 In a 4-3 decision,
the Ohio Supreme Court declined to intervene.93 Questions about the
statute of limitations and standing, the majority reasoned, were properly
addressed on appeal from a final judgment rather than through the
extraordinary remedy of prohibition, which is appropriate only where the
lower court clearly lacked jurisdiction to act.94 The time and expense of
86. Murray v. State, No. 78374, 2002 WL 337732, 4 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2002), appeal
not allowed, 772 N.E.2d 1202 (Ohio 2002).
87. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.07 (West 1994).
88. See Murray, 2002 WL 337732. The opinion did not discuss any basis for tolling the
statute of limitations, nor did it even allude to the subject. That was a curious omission. Unless the
statute had been tolled, the claim was untimely even if it accrued in 1986, when the Ohio wrongfulimprisonment law was passed. See Act of June 3, 1986, 141 Ohio Laws 5351. That law applies to
persons charged with felonies before September 24, 1986. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2743.48(A)(1) (West 1994 & Supp. 2004).
89. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.21 (West 1994).
90. See Murray, 2002 WL 337732 at *3 (citing Witcher v. City of Fairlawn., 680 N.E.2d 713,
715 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); Village Oakwood v. Makar, 463 N.E.2d 61, 64 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983)).
91. Id. at *4.
92. The authors do note Tubbs Jones’s efforts to get the case dismissed. They characterize
one of her arguments as being based on “the tolling of the statute of limitations.” DESARIO &
MASON, supra note 8, at 8. They should have said “running” or “expiration.” See BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1495 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “toll” as “to stop the running of; to abate” and using as
an illustration “toll the limitations period”); cf. id. at 1334 (defining “run” as “to expire after a
prescribed period” and using as an illustration “the statute of limitations had run, so the plaintiff’s
lawsuit was barred”).
93. State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster, 701 N.E.2d 1002 (Ohio 1998).
94. See id. at 1008-09.
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litigation so long after the fact also did not justify departure from
ordinary procedures.95 This reasoning makes sense in an ordinary case
because it avoids piecemeal appeals that could indefinitely prolong
routine litigation. To be sure, it means that time, energy, and resources
might be wasted on a proceeding that amounts to a legal nullity. In
general, this is not especially troublesome. Trial judges sometimes
mistakenly deny motions to dismiss or for summary judgment and
thereby incorrectly allow cases to go to trial. When this happens it
simply takes longer for a case to be resolved. But this was not an
ordinary case. The Sheppard case was unique, a subject of controversy
for nearly half a century. The wrongful-imprisonment lawsuit was
ballyhooed as the last chapter in this long-running affair, the one that
would clear the air about Sam Sheppard.
This in turn leads to a more important problem with dismissing the
case on statute-of-limitations and lack-of-standing grounds after it had
gone through a full trial. Allowing the case to go to trial left open the
possibility that a verdict finding Sam Sheppard innocent might be
overturned on appeal based on what the public could perceive to be legal
technicalities. Overturning a ruling in his favor on the basis of the
statute of limitations or standing would simply confirm the worst
suspicions of those who have long believed that Sam Sheppard was the
victim of a law enforcement vendetta from the very beginning.96
Perhaps avoiding public cynicism about the judicial system is not a
sufficient justification for ruling on these potentially dispositive issues
before trial, although the jurisprudence establishing a First Amendment
presumption of public access to criminal trials rests explicitly on the
notion that open proceedings enhance the legitimacy of the judicial
system in the eyes of the people.97
95. See id. at 1009.
96. Most of the out-of-town media were very surprised by the jury verdict in the first criminal
trial. See NEFF, supra note 4, at 168.
97. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984); “The value of openness
lies in the fact that people not actually attending trials can have confidence that standards of fairness
are being observed; the sure knowledge that anyone is free to attend gives assurance that established
procedures are being followed and that deviations will become known. Openness thus enhances
both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public
confidence in the system.” Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982)
(“Public access to the criminal trial fosters an appearance of fairness, thereby heightening public
respect for the judicial process.”); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571
(1980) (“A result considered untoward may undermine public confidence, and where the trial has
been concealed from public view an unexpected outcome can cause a reaction that the system at
best has failed and at worst has been corrupted.”); id. at 595 (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment). Open trials assure the public that procedural rights are respected, and that justice is
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Of course, we know in retrospect that this scenario did not come to
pass because the jury ruled against Sheppard. But the Ohio Supreme
Court could not have known that this would happen when it decided
whether to allow the trial to proceed.98 Prospectively, the scenario
outlined in the previous paragraph was certainly plausible. Even in
retrospect, however, the court of appeals’ affirmance of the common
pleas court’s judgment leaves the Sheppard case in a troubling state.
Because the court of appeals held that the matter never should have gone
to trial, it did not address the estate’s assignments of error.99 Finding
merit in any of them would have necessitated a new trial. As matters
stand, the jury verdict therefore has only symbolic significance. But it is
an ambiguous symbol. It does not appear to have persuaded those who
believe that Sam Sheppard was innocent.100 On the other hand, those
who think that he did kill his wife, such as the authors of this book,
regard the jury verdict as definitive. The book jacket carries the legend,
in large red block letters: “CASE CLOSED.”
How, then, could the case have been ended before trial despite the
trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss? The statute of limitations
and standing were “controlling question[s] of law” as to which
immediate resolution by a higher court would have “materially
advance[d] the ultimate termination of the litigation.”101 This is the
federal standard for interlocutory appeals.102 That is not the Buckeye
afforded equally. Closed trials breed suspicion of prejudice and arbitrariness, which in turn spawns
disrespect for law. Public access is essential, therefore, if trial adjudication is to achieve the
objective of maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice. Id.
98. Perhaps the four-justice majority assumed that popular attitudes about Sam Sheppard were
so entrenched that nothing that happened in the wrongful-imprisonment case would change any
minds. On this view, there was nothing to gain by premature intervention in the proceedings.
Alternatively, the majority might have thought that preventing a trial on the basis of technicalities
like standing and the statute of limitations before the estate had its day in court might have
reinforced whatever cynicism already existed.
99. See Murray v. State, No. 78374, 2002 WL 337732, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2002),
appeal not allowed, 772 N.E.2d 1202 (Ohio 2002).
100. The jury verdict does not seem to have persuaded those who were convinced that
someone else killed Marilyn Sheppard. For example, Terry Gilbert, the lawyer for the estate,
characterized the jury verdict as “the latest mockery of justice.” DESARIO & MASON, supra note 8,
at 326. And James Neff, the journalist who spent more than five years independently researching
the case, remains convinced that “Dr. Sam Sheppard did not kill his wife.” NEFF, supra note 4, at
382.
101. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2000).
102. Section 1292(b) also provides that there must be “substantial ground for difference of
opinion” about the “controlling question of law.” Id. If those criteria are satisfied, the district court
may certify the question for interlocutory review, and the court of appeals in its discretion may
entertain the issue. It has been suggested that “a relatively low level of uncertainty” should satisfy
the “substantial ground for difference of opinion requirement” in cases where questions such as the
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State’s approach.103 As relevant to the Sheppard case, Ohio law allows
interlocutory appeals only in circumstances where a pretrial ruling
prevents a case from going to trial.104 The denial of a motion to dismiss
for lack of standing or the running of the statute of limitations apparently
does not fall within the strict statutory requirements for interlocutory
review.105 Because those issues could be reviewed on appeal from a
final judgment on the merits, Tubbs Jones tried unsuccessfully to invoke
the Ohio Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction with a petition for a writ
of prohibition to stop the trial from proceeding.106 This required her to
stretch traditional doctrine by arguing that the common pleas court
lacked jurisdiction over the case because the statute of limitations had

statute of limitations are at issue. 16 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS § 3930, at 422, n.15 (2d ed. 1996).
103. Nevertheless, there have been suggestions that Ohio adopt the federal approach to
interlocutory appeals. See Walters v. Enrichment Ctr. of Wishing Well, Inc., 676 N.E.2d 890, 894
n.2 (Ohio 1997); Dayton Women’s Ctr. v. Enix, 555 N.E.2d 956, 960 (Ohio 1990) (Brown, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1047 (1991); Mark J. Chumley, Comment, Fairness and
Finality: Rethinking Final Appealable Orders Under Ohio Law, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 143, 184-85
(1995).
An alternative federal approach allows for interlocutory review of collateral orders, those
“which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the
action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that
appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.” Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). Ohio does not recognize the collateral-order doctrine.
Celebrezze v. Netley, 554 N.E.2d 1292, 1295 (Ohio), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 967 (1990); but cf. City
of Lakewood v. Pfeifer, 613 N.E.2d 1079, 1081 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (relying on a federal
collateral-order case to find appellate jurisdiction to address the legal standard that a trial court
should use in deciding whether to grant a prosecutor’s motion to dismiss a criminal case), review
denied, 609 N.E.2d 171 (Ohio 1993). Even if Ohio did recognize that doctrine, it would not apply
to the Sheppard case because the standing and statute-of-limitations issues were not “separable from
the merits.” See Anderson v. City of Boston, 244 F.3d 236, 240-41 (1st Cir. 2001).
104. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2505.02(B)(1)-(2) (West Supp. 2004). No other provision of §
2505.02 could have applied.
105. The Ohio Supreme Court has never directly addressed this question, but its restrictive
interpretation of § 2505.02 suggests that the statement in text is accurate. See, e.g., Polikoff v.
Adam, 616 N.E.2d 213, 218 (Ohio 1993) (holding that the denial of motion to dismiss a
shareholders’ derivative suit for failure to make a timely prelitigation demand on the board of
directors was not appealable); Chef Italiano Corp. v. Kent State Univ., 541 N.E.2d 64, 67-68 (Ohio
1989) (holding that orders granting partial summary judgment under OHIO R. CIV. P. 54(B) were not
appealable). The leading case on the denial of a motion to dismiss on statute-of-limitations grounds
held that this issue is not appropriate for interlocutory review because it does not “conclusively
determine the action.” State v. Torco Termite Pest Control, 500 N.E.2d 401, 402 (Ohio Ct. App.
1985). The opinion in that case was written by then-Judge Thomas J. Moyer the year before he was
elected chief justice of the Ohio Supreme Court, a position that he still holds. No reported Ohio
decision addresses the availability of interlocutory review of a ruling that upholds a plaintiff’s
standing. Because the denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of standing also does not resolve the
case, such a ruling presumably would not be appealable under § 2505.02.
106. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
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run and the claim had abated on Sam Sheppard’s death.107 These
arguments were not frivolous; they persuaded three members of a sevenjustice court.108 If Ohio took a more flexible approach to interlocutory
appeals, though, such creative lawyering would not have been necessary.
Under federal standards, both issues would have been appropriate
questions for pretrial appellate review.109
Even under state standards, there was an argument for preventing
the trial from taking place. The Ohio Supreme Court has been less
fastidious about procedural niceties than its opinion denying the writ of
prohibition implies. In other settings it has recognized the value of early
resolution of key issues before litigation proceeds too far. For example,
the Court has promulgated a rule under which it will answer certified
questions from federal courts about unresolved issues of state law.110
These matters arise outside the normal appellate process.111 Perhaps for
this reason, the Court has frequently declined to answer such
questions.112 Nevertheless, several major decisions have been handed
down in response to certified questions. Among them are cases
involving high-profile tort issues113 as well as important rulings on
individual liability for employment discrimination114 and the authority of
local boards of health to promulgate anti-smoking rules.115
107. The majority of the Ohio Supreme Court refused to treat these arguments as bearing on
the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. See State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster, 701 N.E.2d
1002, 1008 (Ohio 1998).
108. See id. at 1011 (Douglas, J., joined by Resnick & Sweeney, JJ., dissenting).
109. Federal courts have addressed both issues in interlocutory appeals. See 16 WRIGHT ET
AL., supra note 102, § 3930, at 422-23 & n.15, § 3931, at 453-54 & n.29 (collecting cases).
110. See OHIO SUP. CT. PRAC. R. XVIII.
111. See Rebecca A. Cochran, Federal Court Certification of Questions of State Law to State
Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical Study, 29 J. LEGIS. 157, 170-71 (2003).
112. See, e.g., In re Miller, 762 N.E.2d 368 (Ohio 2002); Comella v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co.,
756 N.E.2d 110 (Ohio 2001); Eabens v. USAir, Inc., 670 N.E.2d 1000 (Ohio 1996); Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Cutcher, 654 N.E.2d 980 (Ohio 1995); Copper v. Buckeye Steel Castings, 621 N.E.2d 396
(Ohio 1993).
113. See Sutowski v. Eli Lilly and Co., 696 N.E.2d 187, 188, 193 (Ohio 1998) (rejecting
market-share liability in DES cases); Sorrell v. Thevenir, 633 N.E.2d 504, 507, 513 (Ohio 1994)
(invalidating a law that abrogated the collateral source rule); Burgess v. Eli Lilly and Co., 609
N.E.2d 140, 141, 143 (Ohio 1993) (invalidating a law providing that a cause of action for DESrelated injuries accrued when the plaintiff learned that she had an injury that might have been
related to DES exposure rather than when she knew or should have known that she had actually
been injured by DES exposure); Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765, 767, 771 (Ohio 1991)
(overturning a statutory cap on general damages in medical malpractice cases).
114. See Genaro v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 703 N.E.2d 782, 784, 787-88 (Ohio 1999) (holding that
individual supervisors and managers may be held jointly liable with their employers for
employment discrimination under Ohio law).
115. See D.A.B.E., Inc. v. Toledo-Lucas County Bd. of Health, 773 N.E.2d 536, 540, 547
(Ohio 2002) (holding that local boards of health do not have such authority).
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In addition, the Ohio Supreme Court has recently entertained
original actions involving facial challenges to controversial legislation.
For example, in State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v.
Sheward,116 the Court allowed an organization of plaintiffs’ lawyers, the
state labor federation, and their leaders to pursue an original action in
prohibition and mandamus challenging a comprehensive tort-reform
statute containing numerous provisions that conflicted with a series of
recent state Supreme Court rulings based on the Ohio Constitution.
More recently, in State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Ohio Bureau of
Workers’ Compensation,117 the Court allowed two labor organizations
and one of their officers to maintain an original action in mandamus
contesting the validity of statutory amendments authorizing private
employers to test injured workers for drugs. In both cases the Court
struck down the challenged legislation without awaiting appeals in the
ordinary course of litigation. The issues were said to be “of such a high
order of public concern”118 that they should be resolved in a “public
action” that was designed “to vindicate the general public interest.”119
The dissenters in Tubbs Jones, who were part of the majority in
these cases, saw a substantial public interest in resolving the statute-oflimitations and standing issues before a trial in the Sheppard civil
case.120 They reasoned that these issues were so easy to resolve that the
lack-of-jurisdiction argument for pretrial dismissal was “both ‘patent and
unambiguous.’”121 Perhaps a stronger argument would have combined
the rationales for answering certified questions and entertaining public

116. 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999).
117. 780 N.E.2d 981 (Ohio 2002).
118. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers, 715 N.E.2d at 1062, 1084; see also Ohio AFL-CIO, 780
N.E.2d at 984-85.
119. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers, 715 N.E.2d at 1083. The Court’s expansive
jurisdictional approach in these cases has been controversial. See Ohio AFL-CIO, 780 N.E.2d at
993 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting) (collecting critical law review commentary about Ohio Academy of
Trial Lawyers); Michael E. Solimine, Recalibrating Justiciability in Ohio Courts, 51 CLEV. ST. L.
REV.531, 541-50 (2004). For a defense of the Court’s willingness to entertain Ohio Academy of
Trial Lawyers, see Jonathan L. Entin, Judicial Selection and Political Culture, 30 CAP. U. L. REV.
523, 534-35 (2002).
120. The fourth member of the Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers and Ohio AFL-CIO majority,
Justice Paul E. Pfeifer, did not sit in Tubbs Jones. See State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster, 701
N.E.2d 1002, 1010 (Ohio 1998). Pfeifer recused himself because the trial judge in the wrongfulimprisonment case, Ronald Suster, was his opponent in the 1998 Ohio Supreme Court election. See
T.C. Brown, Judge to Sub for Justice in Sheppard Deliberations, PLAIN DEALER, July 29, 1998, at
5B.
121. Tubbs Jones, 701 N.E.2d at 1010 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Dep’t of Admin.
Servs., Office of Collective Bargaining v. State Employment Relations Bd., 562 N.E.2d 125, 129
(Ohio 1990)).
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actions. Advocates of certification emphasize the savings in time and
energy that can flow from authoritative determinations of state-law
questions in cases heard in federal courts.122 And the Ohio Supreme
Court has emphasized that public actions are “rare and extraordinary
matters that justify departure from normal procedures.”123
By analogy to certified questions, there was “no controlling
precedent in the decisions of [the Ohio] Supreme Court” with respect to
the statute of limitations and standing for wrongful-imprisonment
claims.124 The analogy to public actions is less direct but certainly
plausible. The public interest in the Sheppard case differed significantly
from the public interest in Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers and Ohio
AFL-CIO. Those cases involved laws that could have affected many
potential litigants. The tort-reform statute in Ohio Academy of Trial
Lawyers could be seen as an obviously invalid attempt to overrule by
legislation a series of judicial interpretations of the state constitution.125
As long as that statute remained on the books, some persons with
otherwise meritorious tort claims might be deterred from pursuing their
legal remedies out of concern that the statute would make litigation
futile.126 Similarly, the drug-testing scheme in Ohio AFL-CIO might
prevent injured workers from seeking compensation for their injuries in
the only forum in which they could obtain relief.127 Resolving these
issues quickly therefore had obvious benefit for the public. The
Sheppard case did not necessarily affect many other potential litigants,
but it raised questions that had festered for decades about the integrity
and legitimacy of the system of law enforcement in Ohio.
The public interest would have been better served by truncating the
proceedings rather than by allowing the ordinary course of litigation to
unfold only to ignore a jury’s verdict. Although providing a forum for
addressing those legitimacy questions might seem to hold out the
prospect of closure, it is difficult to believe that allowing the case to go
to trial only to hold the trial superfluous on appeal would further that

122. See 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS § 4248, at 164-65 (2d ed. 1988).
123. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers, 715 N.E.2d at 1079, 1104.
124. OHIO SUP. CT. PRAC. R. XVIII, § 1.
125. See Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers, 715 N.E.2d at 1084 (“Here, the General Assembly
has . . . reenacted legislation which this court has already determined to be unconstitutional . . . . To
say the least, this is not how our system of government operates.”).
126. See id. at 1111-12 (Pfeifer, J., concurring).
127. See State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Comp., 780 N.E.2d 981, 985
(Ohio 2002) (“[The measure in question] affects every injured worker who seeks to participate in
the workers’ compensation system. It affects virtually everyone who works in Ohio.”).
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goal. If anything, allowing the case to linger could further damage the
legitimacy of the legal system in the eyes of the skeptical, especially if
the threshold questions concerning the statute of limitations and standing
were as clear-cut as the court of appeals found them to be.
III. SOME REALISM ABOUT WRONGFUL IMPRISONMENT
The Sheppard civil case arose under the Ohio law relating to
wrongful imprisonment. The authors perhaps understandably do not
focus on statutory details,128 but those details warrant further attention
for at least two reasons. First, understanding how the law works can
illuminate the behavior of the litigants in that case. Second, the
workings of the Ohio law, which has been characterized as among the
nation’s most beneficent,129 might have more general implications for
the way we think about society’s obligations to those who have been
unjustly incarcerated. This section begins with an overview of the
statute as it existed when the Sheppard civil case was litigated, then
examines how the courts have applied it, and concludes by raising
questions about the assumptions embodied in the law and by suggesting
an alternative perspective on the subject, one that is partially but
problematically embodied in a recent statutory amendment.
A. The Law on the Books
The statute that governed the Sheppard litigation, the main features
128. They allude to the statute briefly but do not explain its specific provisions. See DESARIO
& MASON, supra note 8, at 2-3, 7, 59.
129. See William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric of Innocence, 70 WASH. L. REV. 329, 386 n.268
(1995) (describing Ohio as “particularly generous”); Alberto B. Lopez, $10 and a Denim Jacket: A
Model Statute for Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, 36 GA. L. REV. 665, 704 (2002)
(portraying Ohio’s as among the “more liberal statutory schemes”). There is also a federal
wrongful-imprisonment statute, and 15 other states as well as the District of Columbia have such
laws. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1495, 2513 (2000); ALA. CODE §§ 29-2-150 to -165 (2003); CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 4900-4906 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 505/8(c) (West
1999); IOWA CODE ANN. § 663A.1 (West 1998); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 8241-8244 (West
2003); MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 10-501 (2001 & Supp. 2003); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 541-B:14(II) (1997 & Supp. 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:4C-1 to -6 (West 2001); N.Y.
CT. CL. ACT §§ 8-b, 9(3-a) (McKinney 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-84 (2003); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 51, §§ 154(B), 155(2), 156(H) (West Supp. 2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8108(a)(7) (1999); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 103.001-.154 (Vernon Supp. 2004); W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a (Michie 2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 775.05 (West 2001); D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 2-421 to -425 (2001 & Supp. 2004). North Dakota was one of the first states to enact a
wrongful-imprisonment statute, in 1917. See Act of Feb. 12, 1917, ch. 172, 1917 N.D. Laws 237.
That measure was repealed in 1965. See Act of Mar. 20, 1965, ch. 203, § 86, 1965 N.D. Laws.
373, 406. There were no reported decisions applying or interpreting this statute while it was on the
books, which leaves unexplained why the legislature eliminated the provision.
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of which remain in effect, requires a person seeking compensation from
the State of Ohio for wrongful imprisonment to proceed in two stages.
First, the individual may file suit in the court of common pleas seeking a
declaration of innocence.130 Only someone who was found guilty of a
felony and sentenced to prison is authorized to file suit; felons who pled
guilty and misdemeanants are not covered by this law.131 Moreover, the
conviction must have been vacated, dismissed, or reversed on appeal,
and there must be no possibility of further criminal proceedings relating
to the conduct associated with the conviction.132 Most important, the
court of common pleas must determine that “the offense of which the
individual was found guilty, including all lesser-included offenses, either
was not committed by the individual or was not committed by any
person.”133
130. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.02 (West 1994).
131. See id. § 2743.48(A)(1)-(3) (West 1994 & Supp. 2004) (limiting coverage to cases
involving “an aggravated felony or felony”). This provision disqualifies the more than 90 percent
of felony defendants who plead guilty rather than go to trial. See Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct.
2531, 2556 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and
Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1150, n.330 (2001)). To
what extent this exclusion reduces the number of potential claimants is difficult to determine.
Persons who plead guilty probably are guilty, but some innocent persons who entered guilty please
are known to have made false confessions. See Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The
Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age
of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 478-81 & n.412 (1998). No
reliable data exist about the number and frequency of false confessions, although there is evidence
that such confessions “occur regularly.” Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Social Psychology
of Police Interrogation: The Theory and Classification of True and False Confessions, in 16
STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 189, 191 (Austin Sarat & Susan S. Silbey eds., 1997).
Concerns about the phenomenon of false confessions therefore are “significant, recurrent, and
deeply troubling.” Leo & Ofshe, supra, at 430.
The provision excluding claims arising from guilty pleas also disqualifies anyone who
entered a so-called Alford plea (i.e., a guilty plea entered by a competently represented defendant in
order to avoid more serious charges, see North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)). See Ruff v.
State, No. 9SAPE02-243, 1995 WL 546896 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1995), appeal not allowed,
661 N.E.2d 754 (Ohio 1996). In addition, the statute does not apply to juvenile court matters, see
Wright v. State, 591 N.E.2d 1279, 1283-84 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990), appeal dismissed, 569 N.E.2d
505 (Ohio 1991), or to improper parole revocation resulting in erroneous incarceration, see Dragon
v. State, 548 N.E.2d 246 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988).
132. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(A)(4) (West Supp. 2004) (“The individual’s
conviction was vacated or was dismissed, or reversed on appeal, the prosecuting attorney in the case
cannot or will not seek any further appeal of right or upon leave of court, and no criminal
proceeding is pending, can be brought, or will be brought by any prosecuting attorney, city director
of law, village solicitor, or other chief legal officer of a municipal corporation against the individual
for any act associated with the conviction.”). The previous version of this provision was
substantively identical to the current one. The recent statutory amendment rewrote this sentence to
make it gender neutral. See id. (West 1994).
133. Id. § 2743.48(A)(5) (West Supp. 2004). Again, the prior version of this language was
substantively identical to the current version, which rendered this passage gender neutral. That
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Second, an eligible person who obtains such a determination from
the court of common pleas may then file an action in the Ohio Court of
Claims for compensation.134 The compensation includes a fixed amount
per year of incarceration, originally $25,000; the current figure is in
excess of $40,000 and is adjusted biennially for inflation.135 In addition,
a wrongfully imprisoned individual may recover lost income, fines,
court costs, assessments for housing, board, medical, and ancillary
services while in custody, and reasonable attorney’s fees.136
Despite the apparently favorable provisions of Ohio’s wrongfulimprisonment scheme, claimants have found it difficult to obtain
compensation.137 This has resulted primarily from restrictive judicial
interpretations of the statute, a subject to which we now turn.
B. The Law in Action
At one level, the wrongful-imprisonment law is extremely
generous. Because of the relatively high annual compensation figure,
together with the provisions for lost income, attorney’s fees, and other
costs, six-figure awards are not unheard of.138 Awards of any kind are
recent amendment also provides that a person whose release occurred due to “an error in procedure”
may also qualify as wrongfully imprisoned. Act of Dec. 10, 2002, § 1, 2002 Ohio Legis. Serv. L3131, L-3131 (Banks-Baldwin). On the implications of this addition, which has not yet been
applied in a reported decision, see infra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
134. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(B)-(D) (West 1994 & Supp. 2004).
135. See id. §§ 2743.48(E)(2)(b), 2743.49 (West 1994 & Supp. 2004); see also id. § 117.52
(West Supp. 2004). The higher figure and the indexing procedure were included in a recent
statutory amendment. See Act of Dec. 10, 2002, 2002 Ohio Legis. Serv. L-3131 (Banks-Baldwin).
The Sheppard estate sought the lower figure in the civil trial, which occurred before the amendment
was adopted. See NEFF, supra note 4, at 324; DESARIO & MASON, supra note 8, at 376.
136. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(E)(2)(a), (c)-(d), (F)(2) (West 1994 & Supp. 2004).
The estate proposed a settlement, incorporating all of the statutory bases for compensation,
exceeding $3,000,000. There is some confusion about the actual figure. The document embodying
this proposal called for a total payment of $3,264,300, but the sum of its individual elements came
to $3,314,000. Undoubtedly because nothing turned on the resolution of this point, the authors do
not note the discrepancy or explain how it can be reconciled. See DESARIO & MASON, supra note 8,
at 376. Whatever the correct figure might be, it is about four times the maximum figure that has
ever been awarded under the Ohio statute. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
137. This phenomenon is not unique to Ohio. There have been few awards in other states that
have even more restrictive statutes. See Adele Bernhard, When Justice Fails: Indemnification for
Unjust Conviction, 6 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 73, 105-06 (1999).
138. See Williams v. State, No. 2002-09064-WI, 2003 WL 22285920 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Sept. 29,
2003) (awarding $834,583.85 for wrongful imprisonment of nine and a half years); Cox v. State,
552 N.E.2d 970 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1988) (awarding $110,000 for wrongful imprisonment of one year
and 267 days); see also Connie Schultz, City to Pay $1.6 Million for Man’s Prison Time: Cleveland
Also Agrees to Review Old Cases, PLAIN DEALER, June 8, 2004, at A1 (noting that the state had
paid Michael Green “about $1 million in compensation for 13 years of wrongful imprisonment”);
Connie Schultz, An Unfair Burden: Ohio Is Balking at Paying Michael Green Money Owed Him for
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unusual, however, as Ohio courts have required strict compliance with
the terms of the wrongful-imprisonment law.139 This is so because that
measure represents a limited waiver of the state’s sovereign immunity.140
For example, plaintiffs may not bypass the court of common pleas and
file an original action in the court of claims.141 More significant,
plaintiffs must affirmatively establish their innocence in order to prevail
at the first stage of the wrongful-imprisonment process.
The state courts have focused on two main aspects of the innocence
question. The first point about innocence relates to the burden of proof.
Initially, claimants invoking the wrongful-imprisonment law argued that
the state was precluded from relitigating the question of guilt because
13 Years of Imprisonment for a Rape He Didn’t Commit, PLAIN DEALER, May 22, 2003, at F1
[hereinafter Schultz, An Unfair Burden] (providing additional details about Green’s case); Dan
Horn, The Truth Set Him Free, Freedom Broke His Heart, CIN. ENQUIRER, Sept. 14, 2003, at A1
(noting an award of $380,000 for wrongful imprisonment of ten years); Man Wrongfully Imprisoned
Adjusts to Life on the Outside, PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 10, 1991, at 3-C (noting an award of $367,700
for wrongful imprisonment of nine years); James Bradshaw, State Must Pay Legal Fees for Man
Cleared of Rapes, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Mar. 27, 2001, at 10C (noting an award of approximately
$340,000 for nearly six years of wrongful imprisonment); James Ewinger, Inmate Wins Payoff Over
Wrongful Imprisonment, PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 5, 1997, at 1B (noting an award of $106,597 for
wrongful imprisonment of three years); James F. McCarty, Man Wrongly Imprisoned Gets Check,
PLAIN DEALER, July 14, 1995, at 1B (noting an award of $105,000 for wrongful imprisonment of
four years); Wrongly Imprisoned Man to Get $65,592, PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 10, 1993, at 6B (noting
an award of $65,592 for wrongful imprisonment of more than two years); Fay v. State, 610 N.E.2d
622 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1988) (awarding $64,201 for wrongful imprisonment of two years and 80 days);
cf. Wrongly Imprisoned Man Remains Bitter, PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 31, 1997, at 5B (noting an award
of $717,500 for wrongful imprisonment of five years, entered pursuant to a special bill enacted
before the adoption of § 2743.48).
By way of comparison, the maximum possible award is $5,000 under the federal statute,
see 28 U.S.C. § 2513(e) (2000); $20,000 in New Hampshire, see N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 541B:14(II) (1997); $25,000 in Wisconsin, see WIS. STAT. ANN. § 775.05(4) (West 2001); and $35,000
in Illinois, see 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 505/8(c) (West 1999). As recently as 2000, the
maximum possible award in California was $10,000. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 4904 historical and
statutory note (West Supp. 2004).
139. Between 1975 and September 2003, only 41 persons had obtained compensation for
wrongful imprisonment under § 2743.48 or under the special bills that were used before 1986; about
20 inmates a year have their convictions overturned or are otherwise released in circumstances that
might provide a basis for seeking compensation under the statute. See Horn, supra note 138, at
A12.
140. See Bennett v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. and Corr., 573 N.E.2d 633, 637 (Ohio 1991).
141. See Dvorak v. Pickaway Corr. Inst., 2002 WL 31656236, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 26,
2002) (holding that a federal court’s granting of habeas corpus does not represent a declaration of
innocence and that such a declaration, which can only be made by a court of common pleas, is
prerequisite to an action in the court of claims); cf. Seiber v. State, 2002 WL 31771250, at *3-4
(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2002) (disagreeing, “[w]ith all due respect, with a federal court’s granting
of habeas relief” but noting that a state court must give effect to the federal court’s precise holding);
Williams v. State, 1999 WL 254447, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 1, 1999) (holding that a common
pleas court had erroneously dismissed a wrongful-imprisonment case on the ground that the action
should have been filed in the court of claims but affirming the dismissal on the merits).
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the reversal of the prior conviction, acquittal at retrial, or dismissal of
charges by prosecutors unable or unwilling to retry the defendant
established that the claimant had not committed a crime. The Ohio
Supreme Court correctly rejected this argument in Walden v. State,142 its
first decision interpreting the statute. The Court explained that an
acquittal at a criminal trial shows only that the prosecution failed to
establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but it “is not necessarily a
finding that the accused is innocent.”143 The wrongful-imprisonment
statute directed that the courts “actively separate those who were
wrongfully imprisoned from those who have merely avoided criminal
liability.”144 Allowing plaintiffs to invoke the doctrine of collateral
estoppel would make the first proceeding in the court of common pleas
superfluous. If the legislature meant to make acquittal on retrial or
dismissal of charges after reversal of a conviction conclusive on the
question of innocence, the statute would have allowed plaintiffs to go
directly to the court of claims, bypassing the court of common pleas
altogether.145
Having concluded that a wrongful-imprisonment plaintiff could not
rely on issue preclusion, the Walden Court proceeded to hold that the
plaintiff’s burden of proof was the preponderance of the evidence, the
standard burden in civil cases, rather than clear and convincing
evidence.146 Although the Court’s rejection of preclusion clearly
affected the resolution of wrongful-imprisonment claims, it is not at all
clear that choosing the preponderance standard rather than a higher one
142. 547 N.E.2d 962 (Ohio 1989).
143. Id. at 966. The court noted that “the qualitative differences between civil and criminal
proceedings . . . militate against giving criminal judgments preclusive effect in civil or quasi-civil
litigation.” Id. at 966-67. This formulation overstates the situation. Issue preclusion does not apply
when “[t]he party against whom preclusion is sought had a significantly heavier burden of
persuasion with respect to the issue in the initial action than in the subsequent action [or] the burden
has shifted to his adversary.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(4) (1982). As the
court of appeals had observed in Walden, in a criminal case the government bears the burden of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas in a civil action for wrongful imprisonment the claimant
bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Walden, 547 N.E.2d at 966.
Accordingly, the Restatement provision quoted above “will almost always have the effect of
withholding preclusion as to an issue of fact when the criminal trial that provides the basis for the
wrongful-imprisonment resulted in an acquittal.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, supra,
§ 85, cmt. g. On the other hand, a judgment of conviction can have preclusive effect in subsequent
civil litigation involving the defendant. See id. § 85(1)-(2).
144. Walden, 547 N.E.2d at 967.
145. See id. The court added that the prosecution’s inability to appeal from a final judgment in
criminal cases deprived the state of “a fair opportunity to litigate the issue of . . . innocence because
it cannot seek correction of errors by the trial court which might have led to erroneous acquittals.”
Id.
146. See id. at 967-68.
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has made any difference to the resolution of wrongful-imprisonment
claims.147
Regardless of the formal burden of proof, plaintiffs have run afoul
of the stringent judicial definition of innocence. The cases have focused
on two aspects here as well. First, they have drawn on the distinction
between actual innocence and the avoidance of liability emphasized in
Walden to suggest that persons who are acquitted for insufficient proof
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt are unworthy of compensation. The
Ohio Supreme Court used this approach in Ellis v. State,148 which was
initially heard in tandem with Walden and was appealed again following
the remand from that ruling. The defendant in Ellis was acquitted on the
basis of self-defense at his retrial for assault and sought compensation
for wrongful imprisonment.149 The Court carefully examined the facts
that gave rise to the assault charge and concluded that the defendant had
failed to prove the elements of self-defense by a preponderance of the
evidence and therefore was not entitled to compensation.150 Ellis entered
a business establishment after his stepson got into a fight with the son of
the owner. The owner swung at Ellis, who hit the owner back in what he
claimed was self-defense.151 Because the owner had a right to use nonlethal force to protect his business from trespassers and the stepson had
initiated the fight, Ellis failed to prove that the landlord had no
justification for trying to repel him.152
Similarly, the Ohio Court of Appeals has rejected many wrongfulimprisonment claims for failure to prove innocence. For instance, Ratliff
v. State153 rejected a claim by a man whose conviction for carrying a
concealed weapon had been reversed for insufficient evidence.154 The
court, affirming the common pleas judge, held that the claimant’s

147. The experience in other states suggests that the choice of preponderance or clear and
convincing makes little difference to the outcome of wrongful-imprisonment claims. See Bernhard,
supra note 137, at 108.
148. 596 N.E.2d 428 (Ohio 1992) (per curiam).
149. Id. at 428-29. The Court’s reexamination of the facts might seem problematic at first
glance. In Ohio, self-defense is an affirmative defense that the defendant must establish by a
preponderance of the evidence. See State v. Martin, 488 N.E.2d 166, 167-68 (Ohio 1986), aff’d,
480 U.S. 228 (1987). This might suggest that an acquittal based on self-defense should preclude the
state from relitigating the issue in a subsequent wrongful-imprisonment action. As indicated above,
however, the Ohio Supreme Court properly held in Walden that issue preclusion does not apply in
this situation. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
150. See Ellis, 596 N.E.2d at 431.
151. See id. at 429.
152. See id. at 431.
153. 640 N.E.2d 560 (Ohio Ct. App.), appeal not allowed, 638 N.E.2d 88 (Ohio 1994).
154. See id. at 561.
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admission that he was carrying his pocket knife in an open position
rather than in its normal closed position, combined with other evidence
adduced in the trial court, supported the conclusion that he had failed to
establish his innocence.155
More recently, in Massey v. State,156 an appellate court held that a
mother of four young children whose conviction for felony child
endangerment had been overturned for lack of evidence was not
wrongfully imprisoned because she had failed to prove her innocence.
While she was feeding the children, her two-year-old daughter soiled
herself. She placed the girl into the bathtub to clean her up and then put
her on the toilet seat when a sibling began throwing things into the tub.
The wet child slipped off the seat and struck her head, after which the
woman tried to put her daughter back on the toilet seat only to see her
slip off and hit her head once more. The girl was hospitalized for
observation for three days, then released to her mother.157 The appellate
court affirmed the common pleas judge’s finding that the mother had not
proven her innocence of recklessly endangering her daughter’s health or
safety. Unless there was more to the situation than the opinion suggests,
this is a notably harsh result. However foolish this woman’s decision to
put her wet daughter on the toilet seat even once might have been,
treating Cheryl Massey as a felon and sending her to jail for a year
seems extraordinarily cruel.158 A stern lecture or counseling might have
been a more constructive response. The dissenter accurately described
her as “an innocent person, not just a not-guilty one.”159
Nor are these isolated examples. Numerous other courts have also
closely scrutinized the facts and concluded that wrongful-imprisonment
plaintiffs have failed to prove their innocence.160
155. See id. at 562-63. Among the other evidence, the claimant was carrying the knife in a
dark alley behind a bar at a suspicious hour, he conceded that he had lied to the arresting officer
about why he was carrying the knife and that he had once been arrested for carrying a switchblade,
he had been told not to carry a knife when he was placed on probation on an unrelated charge
several years earlier, and he had earlier pleaded guilty to carrying a straight razor as a concealed
weapon. See id. at 562.
156. Massey v. State, No. C-010325, 2002 WL 252434 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2002).
157. See id. at *2-3.
158. See id. at *1 (noting that Ms. Massey “spent approximately one year in prison before her
conviction was reversed on appeal”).
159. Id. at *3 (Painter, J., dissenting).
160. A notable illustration involves Dale Johnston, who spent nearly seven years on death row
before his conviction was set aside and the charges were dropped. The common pleas court
concluded that Johnston was not entitled to compensation for wrongful imprisonment because he
had failed to prove his innocence. See Conviction Reversed, But Money Denied, PLAIN DEALER,
Aug. 11, 1993, at 3-B. For the rulings setting aside his conviction and excluding unlawfully
obtained evidence from any retrial, see State v. Johnston, 529 N.E.2d 898 (Ohio 1988); State v.
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The second major basis on which wrongful-imprisonment claims
have foundered is the statutory requirement that the claimant be innocent
of any crime relating to the events in question. The statute refers to “the
offense of which the individual was found guilty, including all lesserincluded offenses,”161 but courts have construed this language in very
broad terms. The leading case is Gover v. State,162 in which the Ohio
Supreme Court held that a man whose conviction for safecracking had
been overturned could have been charged with burglary and therefore
was not innocent within the meaning of the wrongful-imprisonment
statute.163 The conviction was set aside because the claimant had broken
a plexiglass cover of an otherwise open safe that was located in a
restaurant’s private dining area. Accordingly, the theft was not covered
by the safecracking law.164 The prosecutor did not charge the thief with
burglary, which is not a lesser-included offense of safecracking,165 but
the Court read the innocence requirement to mean that wrongfulJohnston, 580 N.E.2d 1162 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990). For further analysis of the Johnston case, see
William S. Lofquist, Whodunit? An Examination of the Production of Wrongful Convictions, in
WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE 174 (Saundra D. Westervelt & John A.
Humphrey eds., 2001). For other examples, see Seiber v. State, No. 81314, 2002 WL 31771250
(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2002) (finding insufficient evidence of innocence despite state’s decision
not to retry a defendant whose conviction had been set aside on federal habeas review); Palmer v.
State, No. 2878-M, 1999 WL 820758 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct 13, 1999) (finding insufficient evidence of
innocence of child molestation where the conviction was set aside after the claimant’s daughter, the
victim, recanted her accusation, where the common pleas judge gave great weight to inculpatory
testimony by a physician and a psychologist both at trial and at the hearing on the claimant’s motion
for a new trial); Miller v. State, No. L-97-1009, 1997 WL 728641 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 21, 1997)
(finding insufficient evidence of innocence of a claimant whose conviction for aggravated robbery
and felonious assault was set aside on the basis of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and the
prosecutor declined to retry the case, where the common pleas judge credited the testimony of
robbery victims and disbelieved the claimant’s alibi witnesses), appeal not allowed, 690 N.E.2d
1290 (Ohio 1998); Morris v. State, No. L-97-1009, 1996 WL 307235 (Ohio Ct. App. June 10, 1996)
(finding insufficient evidence of innocence of a claimant whose conviction for aggravated vehicular
homicide was overturned on appeal for lack of evidence that the claimant was driving the car at the
time of the fatal accident and the prosecutor declined to retry the case, where there was some
evidence that the claimant was the driver of the car); Gough v. State, No. 92-CA-15, 1992 WL
173317 (Ohio Ct. App. July 15, 1992) (finding insufficient proof of innocence of a claimant whose
conviction for possession of LSD was overturned on appeal and charges were subsequently
dismissed, where the claimant admitted that LSD was found in his possession), appeal dismissed,
600 N.E.2d 683 (Ohio 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 931 (1993).
161. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(A)(5) (West 1994 & Supp. 2004); see also id. §
2305.02 (West 1994) (conferring jurisdiction on the court of common pleas to hear wrongfulimprisonment claims and using virtually identical language).
162. 616 N.E.2d 207 (Ohio 1993).
163. Id. at 209.
164. See id. at 208.
165. Ohio law defined burglary as the more serious crime. Safecracking was a third-degree
felony, burglary a second-degree felony. See id. at 208, 209.
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imprisonment claimants “must prove that at the time of the incident for
which they were initially charged, they were not engaging in any other
criminal conduct arising out of the incident for which they were initially
charged.”166
Lower courts have applied Gover to reject wrongful-imprisonment
claims where there was evidence that the claimant might have been
committing other crimes. For example, in State v. Harman167 a man
whose conviction for voluntary manslaughter had been overturned on
appeal was held not to be innocent. The prosecutor dismissed the
manslaughter charge in exchange for his guilty plea in a separate
matter.168 The claimant admitted to having fought with and stabbed the
victim, so he had committed offenses other than manslaughter in the
incident.169 Moreover, the original conviction had been reversed due to
a trial error rather than because of a failure of proof.170 There was no
reason to regard Harman as a victim of rank injustice, as he had
effectively gotten off under a plea bargain rather than because he had
been mistakenly accused.
No such explanation can account for the ruling in Chandler v.
State,171 where the Ohio Court of Appeals held that a man whose
conviction for possession of criminal tools had been overturned was not
innocent because there was evidence that he possessed instruments of
drug abuse at the time of his arrest.172 Chandler was sitting in his van
with another man when he was arrested. On the floor between them was
a bag containing syringes, pills, powder, and cash.173 The other man
took full responsibility for the bag and everything in it.174 Nevertheless,
166. Id. at 209 (emphasis added).
167. 724 N.E.2d 1247 (Ohio Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 708 N.E.2d 724 (Ohio 1999).
168. Id. at 1248.
169. Id. at 1250.
170. See id. at 1248, 1250 (noting that the original conviction had been set aside because the
claimant had been denied his right to confront and impeach a witness). See also Cotton v. State,
No. 67403, 1995 WL 168547, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 6, 1995) (finding that a claimant whose
conviction for receiving stolen property was reversed due to erroneous jury instructions and failure
to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt was not innocent because he was arrested in an area where
stolen cars were located while working on automobiles with peeled steering columns and changed
vehicle identification numbers, suggesting that he “was engaged in some kind of illegal conduct”).
171. 641 N.E.2d 1382 (Ohio Ct. App.), appeal not allowed, 639 N.E.2d 794 (Ohio 1994).
172. See id. at 1385-86. Chandler was acquitted of three counts of drug abuse, a second-degree
misdemeanor, but convicted of one count of possession of criminal tools, a fourth-degree felony.
The court of appeals overturned the criminal-tools conviction because it was based on a general
statute rather than on the more specific statute prohibiting possession of instruments of drug abuse.
Id. at 1383.
173. See id. at 1384.
174. See id. at 1384, 1386.
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the open bag was “well within [Chandler’s] reach, and the common
pleas court was therefore entitled to disbelieve his claim of
innocence.”175 Even more remarkable, the appellate court added that,
because the other man “committed the offense, or any of the lesser
included offenses, for which [Chandler] was found guilty,” it followed
that “someone committed the crime for which [he] was convicted and
therefore Chandler could not be deemed to be wrongfully
imprisoned.”176 To put it kindly, this is a counterintuitive reading of the
statutory provision that “the offense of which the individual was found
guilty . . . either was not committed by the individual or was not
committed by any person.”177 If the fact that someone else committed
the crime can defeat a wrongful-imprisonment claim, the statute will be
rendered a virtual nullity. Only if the conduct for which the claimant
was jailed turns out not to be a crime of any kind or if the alleged
offense never happened at all could a wrongful-imprisonment claim
prevail even if a completely innocent person were erroneously convicted
and incarcerated.
C. Rethinking Wrongful Imprisonment
Despite some of the criticism offered in the previous section, the
Ohio courts seem in general to have construed the wrongfulimprisonment statute in accordance with its meaning and purpose. The
provision for a declaration of innocence in a proceeding in the court of
common pleas as a prerequisite to obtaining compensation from the
court of claims clearly contemplates an independent judicial
determination in which the claimant bears the burden of proof.
Accordingly, the judicial refusal to apply issue preclusion and the
concomitant endorsement of the preponderance standard in cases
beginning with Walden make sense. Similarly, the statutory requirement
that a claimant be innocent not only of the crime charged but also of
lesser-included offenses makes it appropriate for courts to focus on
whether other crimes occurred. The Gover and Chandler courts might
have read this requirement more expansively than its language will bear,
but the provision itself clearly prevents some claimants from prevailing.
Why should the wrongful-imprisonment statute limit eligibility for
compensation as it does? Perhaps the legislature was concerned with
175. Id. at 1387.
176. Id. (emphasis added).
177. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(A)(5) (West Supp. 2004) (emphasis added). The
italicized language also appeared in the prior version of the statute. See id. (West 1994).
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protecting the state treasury from unpredictable and uncontrollable
payments.178 This is at best only a partial explanation. After all, fewer
than two dozen persons annually have their convictions overturned.179
Moreover, the legislature could have put a cap on compensation into the
statute.180 The emphasis on innocence, especially the requirement that
the claimant affirmatively prove that he or she did not commit a crime,
strongly suggests an ambivalence about the whole subject. On this view,
some ex-convicts – those who are truly innocent – are deserving of
public sympathy and compensation, whereas others – those who (like
Sam Sheppard?) are suspected of having gotten off on so-called
technicalities such as failure to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
but who nevertheless probably did something wrong – are unworthy of
consideration.181
This hypothesis is consistent with the pattern of judicial rulings in
wrongful-imprisonment cases. For the most part, claimants have
prevailed only when some other person has confessed or been
persuasively identified as the actual perpetrator.182 Some mistakenly
178. Cf. Ratliff v. State, 640 N.E.2d 560, 563 (Ohio Ct. App.) (Grey, J., dissenting) (lamenting
the court’s refusal to find a claimant to have been wrongfully imprisoned “because [this proceeding]
involves a monetary interest”), appeal not allowed, 638 N.E.2d 88 (Ohio 1994).
179. See Horn, supra note 138, at A12.
180. Other wrongful-imprisonment statutes contain such limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2513(e)
(2000) (limiting compensation to $5,000); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/8(c) (West 1999)
(limiting compensation to $35,000, subject to adjustment for inflation); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
14, § 8242(1) (West 2003) (limiting compensation to $300,000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541B:14(II) (1997) (limiting compensation to $20,000); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 148-84 (2003)
(limiting compensation to $500,000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 154(B)(4) (West Supp. 2004)
(limiting compensation to $175,000); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 103.052(a)(2) (Vernon
Supp. 2004) (limiting compensation to $500,000); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 775.05(4) (West 2001)
(limiting compensation to $25,000).
181. Cf. EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
393 (1932) (noting that early wrongful-imprisonment statutes adopted in Europe and a handful of
American states “have endeavored to restrict the indemnity to those only who clearly appear to
deserve it”); Edwin Borchard, State Indemnity for Errors of Criminal Justice, 21 B.U. L. REV. 201,
208 (1941) (proposing a model wrongful-imprisonment statute that would be limited to victims of
“the grossest injustice” who were “most deserving” of compensation).
182. See, e.g., Fay v. State, 610 N.E.2d 622, 622 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1988) (“[F]urther investigation
led to proof that other individuals committed the crime.”), discussed in MICHAEL L. RADELET ET
AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE: ERRONEOUS CONVICTIONS IN CAPITAL CASES 218-29 (1992); Cox v.
State, 552 N.E.2d 970, 971 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1988) (noting that another person confessed); Man’s Rape
Charge Dismissed After Recantation: Victim Says Threats Kept Truth Hidden, PLAIN DEALER, Aug.
28, 1999, at 7B (noting that the complainant in a child-rape case subsequently admitted that she had
falsely accused a neighbor of raping her because of threats from her late father, the actual
perpetrator); Horn, supra note 138, at A12 (providing additional details about the same child-rape
case); Schultz, An Unfair Burden, supra note 138, at F3 (noting that another person confessed to the
crime a week after publication of a series of newspaper articles about the wrongly imprisoned
suspect); Man Wrongfully Imprisoned Adjusts to Life on the Outside, supra note 138 (noting that
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convicted individuals have been exonerated by DNA evidence that
eliminated them as suspects.183 Occasionally, a plaintiff has established
that no crime at all was committed. For example, in the case that led to
the largest single compensation award on record in Ohio, a woman who
accused a man of raping her when she was twelve years old admitted
more than a decade later that she had made up her accusation in response
to her mother’s questions about marks on her neck.184
The Ohio legislature recently amended the wrongful-imprisonment
statute to expand the class of persons eligible for compensation, but the
revised version presents additional difficulties that might well frustrate
the General Assembly’s apparent generosity. Under a provision that
took effect in April 2003, individuals released due to “an error in
procedure” as well as those who are judicially determined not to have
committed a crime are allowed to file a claim against the state.185 The
precise meaning of the new language remains unclear. No court has yet
interpreted this provision, and the legislative history is unilluminating.186
another man confessed to crime for which the claimant had been convicted); Wrongly Imprisoned
Man Remains Bitter, supra note 138 (noting that two crime victims recanted their eyewitness
identification after seeing a newspaper picture of the actual perpetrator following his arrest for
another crime).
These cases might explain why the Sheppard estate devoted so much effort to implicate Richard
Eberling as the real murderer. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
183. See Bradshaw, supra note 138; McCarty, supra note 138.
184. See Donna J. Robb, For Freed Man, Hearing Is Like New Trial, PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 16,
2002, at B3; Donna J. Robb, State Must Pay Wrongfully Imprisoned Man, PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 1,
2002, at A1, A8.
Another possible example involves Nathaniel Lewis, who was convicted of rape in
connection with a sexual encounter that he claimed was consensual and who is now seeking up to
$600,000 in compensation for wrongful imprisonment. Lewis served five years in prison for rape
before his conviction was overturned because the trial judge improperly excluded portions of the
complainant’s journal that cast doubt on her credibility. See Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413 (6th
Cir. 2002). He was recently declared innocent by a common pleas judge in circumstances where
other courts might have ruled against him. See supra note 160 (discussing cases in which courts
have ruled that claimants had failed to prove their innocence). The state chose not to retry Lewis
because he had already served most of his sentence and the complainant declined to testify at a
second criminal trial; she did return for his wrongful-imprisonment hearing and reiterated her
testimony at the original trial. See Accused Rapist Gets Vindication, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL,
June 4, 2004, at A1; Karen Farkas, Wrongfully Imprisoned Man in Line for State Restitution, PLAIN
DEALER, June 4, 2004, at B1. The state has appealed the innocence ruling, however. See Karen
Farkas, State Appeals Ruling Saying Man Wrongly Imprisoned, PLAIN DEALER, June 25, 2004, at
B2.
185. Act of Dec. 10, 2002, § 1, 2002 Ohio Legis. Serv. L-3131, L-3131 (Banks-Baldwin)
(codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(A)(5) (West Supp. 2004)).
186. The original bill was intended only to increase the amount of compensation to take
account of inflation since the wrongful-imprisonment statute was enacted in 1986. See S.B. 149,
124th Ohio Gen. Assemb. (2001); Ohio Legis. Serv. Comm’n, S.B. 149 Bill Analysis (2001).
Language establishing a procedure for indexing the payment for future cost-of-living increases as
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Even a cursory reading suggests that claimants relying on the new
language need not establish their innocence in order to obtain
compensation, because the amended provision makes procedural error
and judicial determination of innocence alternative grounds for relief.187
Only a few claimants who have been denied relief for failure to prove
their innocence would have benefited from the procedural-error
provision, and those cases have not involved especially sympathetic
facts suggesting that those persons are particularly worthy of
compensation.188
Whatever the new language means, however, the amended statute
creates a very peculiar process. Under the amended version of the
wrongful-imprisonment statute, claimants who are actually innocent
must continue to prove that they did not commit a crime in order to
obtain compensation. On the other hand, claimants who might be guilty
of an offense but whose convictions were overturned for procedural
reasons are entitled to compensation without demonstrating their lack of
guilt. In other words, those who are most deserving – individuals who
did not commit a crime – will have more difficulty establishing their
right to compensation from the state than will less deserving individuals
– those who were released due to procedural errors, who presumably did
commit a crime but whose guilt beyond a reasonable doubt cannot be
proved because of a governmental blunder.189
It is perhaps
understandable that the state might want to limit the number of persons
who may receive payments from the public fisc, but it is perverse to

well as the expansion of eligibility for compensation to those released due to a procedural error was
added by the House Committee on Civil and Commercial Law. See Sub. S.B. 149, 124th Ohio Gen.
Assemb. (2002); Ohio Legis. Serv. Comm’n, Sub. S.B. 149 Bill Analysis (2002). The analyses
accompanying the House substitute and the bill on final passage focus mainly on the inflation
provisions and simply refer to the expansion of eligibility without explaining the meaning of the
new language.
187. The amended provision reads:
Subsequent to sentencing and during or subsequent to imprisonment, an error in
procedure resulted in the individual’s release, or it was determined by a court of common
pleas that the offense of which the individual was found guilty, including all lesserincluded offenses, either was not committed by the individual or was not committed by
any person.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(A)(5) (West Supp. 2004) (emphasis added).
188. Perhaps the only case discussed here in which the procedural error would have justified an
award of compensation despite the claimant’s inability to prove his innocence was Harman, which
involved trial errors. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. Other rejected claimants with
much more compelling grounds for compensation could not have relied on procedural error as an
alternative basis for relief. See supra notes 148-60 and accompanying text.
189. Cf. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.) (“The criminal is to go
free because the constable has blundered”) (criticizing the exclusionary rule).
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make it easier for those with weaker grounds for relief to obtain
compensation than those with more compelling claims.
There is, however, another way to think about wrongful
imprisonment. Compensation for wrongful imprisonment serves at least
two important functions. First, it recognizes that society has perpetrated
an injustice on an individual who was incarcerated in violation of
applicable legal standards.190 Second, it provides the recipient an
opportunity for rehabilitation and a return to a reasonably normal life,191
although compensation does not guarantee a happy outcome for a
claimant who suffered a serious injustice at the hands of society.192
Persons who cannot prove their innocence might not have as powerful a
moral claim to compensation from the state as persons who
unquestionably did not commit a crime, but surely they have at least as
strong a claim as offenders whose convictions are set aside on the basis
of procedural error.
From this perspective, the concern should be with providing some
compensation to all persons who were wrongfully imprisoned for
whatever reason. This does not necessarily mean that every claimant
should receive the same amount of compensation or that every claimant
is equally deserving. Whatever the equities of individual situations,
however, the government may not incarcerate anyone without a fair trial
and proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. By definition, the original
proceeding in wrongful-imprisonment cases failed to satisfy at least one
of those standards. Once a conviction has been overturned, the
prosecution has a choice between properly retrying the accused and
dismissing the charges. Suppose instead that the government did things
right the first time. There are only two possibilities: the accused would
never have been tried or would have been acquitted. In either case, the
claimant would not have been imprisoned but would have remained at
liberty. This is so whether the accused was actually innocent or the
authorities lacked sufficient evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.
The government may have no legal obligation to compensate
190. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(warning that “government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher” and that “[i]f the government
becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law”); Note, Postrelease Remedies for Wrongful
Conviction, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1615, 1627 (1961).
191. See, e.g., Anders Bratholm, Compensation of Persons Wrongfully Accused or Convicted
in Norway, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 841 (1961).
192. See, e.g., Horn, supra note 138 (describing the problems that beset Johnny Reeves despite
compensation of $380,000 for ten years of wrongful imprisonment for a crime of which he was
falsely accused).
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wrongfully imprisoned individuals,193 but surely the state has some
moral obligation to those whose freedom it has denied without
justification.194 Because the government has greater fact-finding
resources than does the typical private individual, the law should not
require a mistakenly convicted person to prove her innocence.195
Instead, anyone released from incarceration after having a conviction
overturned should receive compensation for wrongful imprisonment.
There is some precedent for such a system in Scandinavia, where
expansive compensation arrangements for persons improperly held in
custody have existed for over a century.196 For example, the Norwegian
Criminal Procedure Act contains a provision originally adopted in 1887
under which an individual acquitted at a retrial following the reversal of
a conviction is entitled to compensation “even if grounds for suspicion
still exist.”197
It does not necessarily follow, however, that all claimants are
entitled to the same amount of compensation.198 The current version of
Ohio’s wrongful-imprisonment statute, whatever its defects,199
193. See Bennett v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. and Corr., 573 N.E.2d 633, 637 (Ohio 1991) (noting
that enactment of the wrongful-imprisonment statute was necessary in order to waive the state’s
sovereign immunity); Walden v. State, 547 N.E.2d 962, 968 (Ohio 1989) (noting the state’s
common-law sovereign immunity absent a statutory waiver); Wright v. State, 591 N.E.2d 1279,
1281 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (noting that statutory waivers of sovereign immunity “must be strictly
construed”), appeal dismissed, 569 N.E.2d 505 (Ohio 1991); Bernhard, supra note 137, at 86-92
(summarizing the obstacles to suits against law enforcement officials and other potential defendants
in tort actions); Lopez, supra note 129, at 690-98 (discussing barriers to suits under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against prosecutors and police officers and to malpractice claims against defense attorneys).
194. See Note, supra note 190, at 1627.
195. See Joseph H. King, Jr., Comment, Compensation of Persons Erroneously Confined by
the State, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1091, 1110-11 (1970).
196. These laws, adopted between 1886 and 1888 in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, provide
compensation not only for wrongful imprisonment following the reversal of a conviction but also
authorize awards under some circumstances in the event of acquittal at a first trial and for wrongful
detention if charges are dropped without any trial at all. Bratholm, supra note 191, at 833, 835-37.
The claimant must establish her innocence in order to obtain compensation for wrongful detention.
Id. at 836-37.
197. Id. at 836. The current version of this law is embodied in §§ 444-451 of the Act of 22
May 1981, No. 25, Relating to Legal Procedure in Criminal Cases as amended (unofficial English
translation by the Ministry of Justice, Oslo, 1998). According to § 444, “If a sentence of
imprisonment or other custodial sanction has already been executed, any damage resulting from this
shall be compensated for without regard to what has been shown to be probable. In other words, a
claimant acquitted at retrial need not prove her innocence of the charge.” Similar measures were
adopted in Denmark and Sweden in 1886 and 1888. Bratholm, supra note 196, at 834.
198. Cf. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 358 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (stating that “[i]n for a calf is not always in for a cow” and explaining that a conclusion
in one case does not necessarily control the disposition of another case raising somewhat different
concerns).
199. See supra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
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recognizes that a conviction might be overturned either because a person
was not guilty of a crime or because procedural errors fatally infected
the verdict. Individuals in the former category have a more compelling
moral claim for compensation than do those in the latter category. This
conclusion does not reflect a simple concern for preserving public funds,
especially in difficult economic and budgetary times. It reflects a more
general distinction about the extent of desert or blameworthiness. A
couple of examples will illustrate the point. Consider first the debate
over how to treat Vietnam War resisters. Some people advocated an
amnesty as a way of restoring national unity in the wake of a divisive
conflict, while others strenuously objected to any policy that would
reward those who had chosen to avoid military service at a time of
national need.200 Ultimately, Presidents Ford and Carter adopted more
limited programs that provided relief to only a small minority of those
who would have been covered by a general amnesty.201 Now consider
the legal significance of pardons. There are two approaches to this
question. The first contends that a pardon “releases the punishment and
blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender
is as innocent as if he had never committed the offence.”202 The second
views a pardon as “carr[ying] an imputation of guilt [and] acceptance a
confession of it.”203 The overwhelming weight of judicial authority has
rejected the first view,204 although there have been vigorous dissents in
some cases.205 The reluctance to treat a pardon as conclusively
200. See LAWRENCE M. BASKIR & WILLIAM A. STRAUSS, CHANCE AND CIRCUMSTANCE: THE
DRAFT, THE WAR, AND THE VIETNAM GENERATION 203-10 (1978).
201. President Ford’s program required performance up to two years of alternative service as a
prerequisite to obtaining clemency. Id. at 212-13; see generally id. at 210-26. President Carter
offered pardons to draft resisters, who were largely white and middle class, but not to deserters, who
were disproportionately black and lower class. Id. at 230-31; see generally id. at 226-35.
202. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1867).
203. Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 94 (1915); see also id. at 91 (noting the
“confession of guilt implied in the acceptance of a pardon” and observing that a person may
therefore reject a pardon). This is not a purely hypothetical observation. To cite one notable
example, Eugene Debs, who was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment for a speech opposing
American involvement in World War I, see Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919), refused to
accept a presidential pardon and ultimately had his sentence commuted in December 1921. See
RAY GINGER, THE BENDING CROSS: A BIOGRAPHY OF EUGENE VICTOR DEBS 405-06, 413 (1949);
NICK SALVATORE, EUGENE V. DEBS: CITIZEN AND SOCIALIST 327-28 (1982).
204. In re Abrams, 689 A.2d 6, 13-16 (D.C.) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Abrams v. Office
of Bar Counsel, 521 U.S. 1121 (1997).
205. See, e.g., In re North (George Fee Application), 62 F.3d 1434, 1439-40 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(Sneed, J., dissenting); In re Abrams, 689 A.2d at 28-40 (Terry, J., dissenting in a 5-4 decision). Cf.
In re Borders, 797 A.2d 716 (D.C. 2002) (rejecting a claim that a presidential pardon automatically
entitled a disbarred lawyer to reinstatement but allowing the applicant to seek reinstatement through
the normal petition process and specifically stating that he could adduce the pardon as evidence
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determining that the recipient did not commit a crime reflects unease
over ignoring evidence that the individual might actually have engaged
in dishonorable or unlawful conduct that might bear on his character or
fitness in the future.206
These examples suggest that a wrongful-imprisonment regime
should provide more compensation to those with the strongest moral
claims against the state and less compensation to those with weaker but
still legitimate claims. On this view, those with less compelling cases
might be limited to lost income and perhaps attorney’s fees as well as
fines, court costs, and assessments for housing, board, medical, and
ancillary services while in custody, all of which are available under
Ohio’s current statute to claimants who prove their innocence;207 they
would not be eligible for compensation for the time they were
wrongfully imprisoned. Under this approach persons with weaker
claims for compensation would be limited to actual financial losses,
while those with stronger claims would also be indemnified for the time
they were wrongfully held in prison. As a practical matter, this would
substantially limit the payments to individuals who cannot prove their
innocence because most of the money that has been awarded under the
wrongful-imprisonment statute has provided recompense for the period
of incarceration.208
At first glance, that statute contains a basis for distinguishing
stronger from weaker claimants through its identification of two separate
bases for compensation: procedural error and judicial declaration of
innocence.209 Things are not as straightforward as they might appear,
supporting reinstatement). For other recent cases addressing the legal significance of pardons, see,
e.g., United States v. Schaffer, 240 F.3d 35 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam) (holding that a
presidential pardon moots pending appeals); Wilson v. Lawrence County, 154 F.3d 757 (8th Cir.
1998) (holding that a person who received a gubernatorial pardon could pursue a civil rights action
for wrongful imprisonment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Anderson v. Commonwealth, 107 S.W.3d 193
(Ky. 2003) (holding that a pardon did not restore a man’s right to serve as a juror); Catanese v. La.
Gaming Control Bd., 712 So. 2d 666 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a person who had been
pardoned for a drug offense could be denied a permit to work in a state-regulated facility), writ
denied, 726 So. 2d 30 (La. 1998); State v. Baucom, 531 S.E.2d 922 (S.C. 2000) (holding that
previous convictions for which the defendant had been pardoned could not be considered for
sentencing purposes). These issues do not arise only in the United States. See, e.g., Re Therrien,
[2001] 2 S.C.R. 3 (Can.) (upholding the removal of a provincial judge who had failed to disclose a
conviction for which he had been pardoned years earlier).
206. See Samuel Williston, Does a Pardon Blot Out Guilt?, 28 HARV. L. REV. 647, 653
(1915).
207. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(E)(2)(a), (c)-(d), (F)(2) (West 1994 & Supp. 2004);
supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 138 (discussing the cases that had the largest compensation awards).
209. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(A)(5) (West Supp. 2004); supra note 185 and
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however. To begin with, the statute actually treats persons with weaker
claims – based on procedural error – more favorably than it treats
individuals with stronger claims – based on innocence.210 Moreover,
procedural error is only an imperfect proxy for identifying weaker but
nonetheless colorable claims of innocence. This is so because the errors
encompassed by this ground are likely to have rendered a trial unfair but
not necessarily to have resulted in an incorrect determination of guilt.211
The most troublesome claims involve persons whose convictions
have been overturned, but who cannot prove their innocence despite at
least reasonable (and, in some instances, substantial) doubt as to their
guilt. Examples include Massey, where it was not clear that any crime at
all had occurred;212 Chandler, where there was significant evidence that
another person who took responsibility for the crime had in fact
committed the offense;213 Gover, where the prosecutor failed to charge
the claimant with a crime that the common pleas court subsequently
accompanying text.
210. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
211. Trial errors can arise in various contexts, such as: (1) improper advocacy, see, e.g.,
Romine v. Head, 253 F.3d 1349, 1366-71 (11th Cir. 2001) (collecting cases on improper
prosecutorial references to the Bible during criminal trials), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1011 (2002);
Arnett v. Jackson, 290 F. Supp. 2d 874, 878 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (granting habeas corpus relief
because the trial judge relied on the Bible in imposing sentence); Redman v. Watch Tower Bible
and Tract Soc’y of Pa., 630 N.E.2d 676 (Ohio 1994) (reversing a judgment because the trial court
allowed use of religious beliefs to impeach a witness); (2) improper evidentiary rulings, see, e.g.,
State v. Harman, 724 N.E.2d 1247 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (reversing a conviction because the trial
judge impermissibly limited the defendant’s right of confrontation at trial), appeal dismissed, 708
N.E.2d 724 (Ohio 1999); see supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text; (3) improper jury
selection procedures, see, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (holding that
gender-based peremptory challenges to prospective jurors are unconstitutional); Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that race-based peremptory challenges to prospective jurors
are unconstitutional); see generally Eric L. Muller, Resolving the Batson Paradox: Harmless Error,
Jury Representation, and the Sixth Amendment, 106 YALE L.J. 93 (1996); and (4) improper jury
instructions, see, e.g., State v. Lessin, 620 N.E.2d 72, 78-79 (Ohio 1993) (overturning a conviction
for incitement of violence based on the defendant’s burning of an American flag during a protest
demonstration on the basis of the trial judge’s refusal to instruct the jury about the First
Amendment), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1194 (1994); see generally Jonathan L. Entin, Right, Wrong in
Lessin Decision, PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 3, 1993, at 7-B.
It is possible that mistakes by the police, such as failure to give the warnings required by
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), or unlawful searches and seizures might fall into the
category of procedural error, although that conclusion is not obvious. Because the remedy for such
violations is suppression of any resulting evidence, a conviction overturned on either of these
grounds will likely fail for lack of evidence rather than as a result of procedural error. But cf. State
v. Miranda, 450 P.2d 364 (Ariz. 1969) (affirming Ernesto Miranda’s conviction following his retrial
based solely on evidence that had not been deemed inadmissible by the Supreme Court), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 868 (1969). Resolving this matter is beyond the scope of the present paper.
212. See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 171-77 and accompanying text.
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determined he had committed even though the latter crime was not a
lesser included offense of the one for which the conviction had been
overturned;214 and the many cases in which courts have ruled that
claimants failed to prove their innocence by a preponderance of the
evidence even though their convictions had been set aside.215 The jury
verdict in the civil case suggests that Sheppard fits into this category as
well, although DeSario and Mason clearly disagree.216
In short, the two bases for compensating wrongfully imprisoned
persons – acknowledging injustice that those individuals have suffered at
society’s hands and enabling them to put their lives back together –
argue powerfully for providing monetary relief even to those claimants
who cannot prove their innocence. Accordingly, Ohio’s new statutory
line between claimants freed as a result of procedural mistakes and those
freed due to actual innocence should not serve as the basis for
distinguishing between those persons who receive full compensation and
those who receive partial compensation.
Even critics of a presumptive entitlement to compensation for
persons who have been wrongfully imprisoned but cannot prove their
innocence should recognize that the structure and implementation of the
Ohio statute leave much to be desired. At a minimum, the standard for
establishing innocence under that law should be interpreted less
stringently than it has been so far. The recent amendment expanding the
basis for compensation to cover claimants freed due to procedural error
rather than innocence should be revised to make it no easier to obtain
compensation on the basis of procedural error than on the basis of
innocence, and the legislature should consider a sliding scale of
payments based on the strength of the moral claim for compensation.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is perhaps understandable why Dr. Sam Sheppard’s estate sought
a declaration of innocence under Ohio’s wrongful-imprisonment statute,
214. See supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text.
215. See supra note 160 (collecting cases).
216. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. One respect in which the Sheppard case
differs from these others concerns the mix of bases for compensation. Assuming that the standing
and statute-of-limitations problems had not precluded the wrongful-imprisonment claim, Sheppard’s
financial losses, primarily lost income and attorney’s fees, would have vastly surpassed the amount
of compensation for the period during which he was wrongfully imprisoned. See DESARIO &
MASON, supra note 8, at 376. Thus, even if he or the estate could not have established his
innocence, the compensation award under the system proposed here would have been substantial.
That this aspect of the case might be atypical of wrongful-imprisonment claims should come as no
surprise. As noted at the outset, the Sheppard case was unique in the annals of Ohio law.
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but the effort was probably misguided from the outset. The passage of
time made it almost impossible to determine with confidence what
actually happened on that awful night half a century ago. In any event,
public attitudes about the case have become sufficiently settled that the
outcome of a lawsuit probably could not persuade very many people to
change their minds. Prosecutor Mason and political scientist DeSario
have marshaled the strongest arguments for Sheppard’s guilt, but it
would be wrong to suggest that they have provided the last word on the
controversy.
The Sheppard case reveals some troubling aspects of Ohio’s legal
system. Aside from the prejudicial publicity that infected the first trial,
the wrongful-imprisonment case should never have gotten past the
pleading stage if the ultimate disposition was correct. If the claim died
with Dr. Sheppard or the statute of limitations had long since expired,
going through yet another trial served no constructive purpose. The
prosecutor’s office and other law enforcement agencies might claim a
measure of vindication from the jury verdict, but the debate has hardly
ended as a result.217 There was no legally plausible reason to conduct a
third trial other than the rigidities of Buckeye State appellate procedure,
rigidities that the Ohio Supreme Court has finessed in recent years when
doing so seemed convenient.
In the end, the final Sam Sheppard trial served one truly valuable
function: it gave us a chance to look carefully at Ohio’s wrongfulimprisonment law and ask some hard questions about what it means and
how it works. As generous as the statute appears, at least compared with
others in this country, it rests on some dubious premises and rewards too
many of the wrong people at the expense of more deserving claimants.
Perhaps this last trial and the commentary it has spawned will enable us
to improve that law.

217. See, e.g., NEFF, supra note 4, at 381-86 (criticizing the verdict and insisting both that Sam
Sheppard was innocent and that Richard Eberling murdered Marilyn Sheppard).
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